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RETURNEES FROM SOUTH AMERICA: JAPAN'S
MODEL FOR LEGAL MULTICULTURALISM?
Claire J. Hurt
Abstract: In response to Japan's increasing labor shortage, the Japanese
government in 1990 enacted an extensive set of amendments to its restrictive
Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act to allow for a controlled but broader
method of regulating legal entry of foreign workers into Japan. Significant among those
amendments are the provisions granting long-term resident status to persons of Japanese
descent entering from abroad and the provisions offering additional rights to foreign-born
spouses and children of Japanese nationals. These provisions are mainly targeted at
descendants of Japanese who emigrated to South America ("Nikkeijin"). While most of
the existing literature about minority rights in Japan focuses on (1) historic national
minorities, (2) Korean and Chinese permanent residents, and (3) legal and illegal workers
from Asia who are "newcomers," this Comment discusses a fourth distinct group: the
returnees or Nikkeijin from South America. This Comment examines and analyzes the
way ethnic difference is accommodated within the Japanese legal system at the
constitutional level, and focuses on the administrative and social accommodation of
returnees as contrasted with the discourse of legal rights that is associated with other legal
residents of Japan-for example, the Korean and Ainu populations. This Comment
argues that the treatment of the returnees serves as a forum where Japanese policymakers
can discuss a framework for multiculturalism that is not found in constitutional rights
discourse, and concludes that although the returnees are small in number, they are legally
and socially significant because provisions for their integration into Japanese society
have become a catalyst for a defacto policy of legal multiculturalism in Japan.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Japan's immigration laws were amended in 1990, increasing
numbers of Japanese descendants from South America-known as South
American Nikkeijinl-have been immigrating to Japan under new provisions
enacted specifically to recruit such individuals. Contrary to existing
t The author would like to thank Professor Veronica Taylor, without whom this Comment would
not have been possible. The author would also like to thank the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal
Editorial Staff for their support. Finally, the author thanks her family and friends for their patience and
encouragement throughout the writing process.
The term Nikkeijin broadly refers to descendants of Japanese who emigrated abroad between 1868
and 1973, but more specifically identifies South American-Japanese descendants up to the third generation
and their spouses, primarily those from Brazil or Peru. Yoko Sellek, The Phenomenon of Return
Migration, in JAPAN'S MINORmIES: THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY 178 (Michael Weiner ed., 1997). As
used in this Comment, the term Nikkeijin will be used in the latter sense. The terns Nikkeijin, South
American-Japanese, Japanese-Brazilians, and Nikkei Brazilians will be used interchangeably throughout
this Comment.
2 DEMETRIOs G. PAPADEMETRIOU & KIMBERLY A. HAMILTON, REINVENTING JAPAN:
IMMIGRATION'S ROLE IN SHAPING JAPAN'S FUTURE 37 (2000).
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immigration policy prohibiting the entry of unskilled foreign labor, 3
Nikkeijin and their families have been able to enter Japan under a newly
created residence status without prohibitions on the type of work in which
they could engage. Consequently, many Nikkeijin have taken advantage of
this new legal opening to migrate to Japan mostly as legal unskilled
workers.4 Thus, the so-called "return" of Japanese descendants from South
America has satisfied Japan's demand for workers under an acceptable
government immigration policy. By 2000, South American immigrants to
Japan, an overwhelming majority of whom are Nikkeijin, accounted for
eighteen percent of the registered foreign population, a figure that is
5
expected to continue growing.
Presumably, Nikkeijin's Japanese pedigree would facilitate their
integration into Japanese society; however, interestingly, this has not been
the case. Because Nikkeijin have been socialized as Latin Americans, they
are linguistically and culturally non-Japanese. Rather than blending into
Japanese society unnoticed, Nikkeijin have formed their own ethnic
enclaves, creating for themselves a unique place in society where they are
neither completely "Japanese," nor entirely "foreign." Rejected by
mainstream Japanese, Nikkeijin are, in fact, an ethnic minority group.
The difficulties in cultural integration encountered by South American
Japanese have prompted some municipalities where returnees live and work
to create social and legal accommodations in the areas of housing, education,
and social services that recognize returnees' linguistic and cultural
differences. The treatment of the returnees by local governments has served
as a catalyst for legal change because, in an effort to help them integrate into
Japanese society, local governments have promulgated policies that
accommodate not only Nikkeijin, but also other foreigners. The local
accommodation policies, however, are a departure from the more
conservative policies of the central government. These policymaking
activities at the local level are significant because they expose the tension
3 The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Cabinet Order No. 319 of 1951, amended
by Law No. 135 of 1999, art. 19(1), provisional translation (Japan), http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/IB/ib-
20.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Immigration Control Act]. The Immigration Control Act
regulates the entry and residence of all foreigners in Japan. A foreigner may reside in Japan under one of
the twenty-seven categories of status of residence, and is prohibited from engaging in work outside of
his/her residence status without special permission. Unskilled manual labor is not included among the
types of employment activities in which a foreigner can engage. Id.
4 Basic Plan for Immigration Control, 2d ed., Ministry of Justice, Mar. 2000, provisional
translation, pt. IH.1(4), at http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISHIBIB200O/ib.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter Basic Plan].
5 Number of Non-Japanese Residents in Japan by Country, as of 2000, at http://jinjapan.org/
stat/stats/21MIG22html (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
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between the central and local governments: namely, the different set of
assumptions about the composition of Japanese society that govern the
national immigration law versus those that drive local accommodation
policies.
This Comment examines the Nikkeijin for whom local government
policies are tailored. Part II discusses the factors prompting changes to
Japan's immigration law, and Part III examines the resulting amendments.
Part IV illustrates the social integration difficulties of returnees. Part V
focuses on the social and legal accommodations for returnees being made at
the local government level. Part VI analyzes how ethnic difference is
accommodated within the Japanese legal system. Part VII highlights the
policy tensions between central and local governments. Part VIII concludes
that the returnee group is significant because it has become a catalyst for
important legal change, and that local governments serve as a forum where
Japanese policymakers can begin to discuss legal multiculturalism that
recognizes cultural differences in a traditionally ethnically homogenous
Japan.
II. FACTORS LEADING TO THE 1990 AMENDMENTS TO THE IMMIGRATION
CONTROL AND REFUGEE RECOGNITION ACT
A. Japan's Labor Shortage
1. The "Bubble" Economy's Perverted Effect on the Labor Market
With the extraordinary economic growth experienced during the
1980s, Japan increased its stature in the world economy.6 The economic
prosperity of Japan's "bubble economy, 7 however, distorted the labor
market. The growth in capital investments exceeded the existing labor
supply.8  In earlier decades, demands in the labor market were met by
drawing from the large pool of labor in Japan's primary economic sectors:
6 As the value of the yen rose dramatically from 1985 to the mid-1990s, Japanese business
investment increased by almost 225%, especially in the manufacturing and construction industries.
PAPADEMETRIOU & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 10. Between 1987 and 1991, Japan's gross domestic
product was at its highest. Id.
7 The period of extraordinary economic growth experienced during the 1980s and early 1990s is
often referred to as the "Heisei boom" (after the contemporary emperor's reign) or the "bubble economy."
Id.
8 Robert Neff, Japan: Will It Lose Its Competitive Edge?, Bus. WK., Apr. 27, 1992, at 51, LEXIS,
News Group File.
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agriculture, forestry, and fishery.9 By the mid-1980s, however, the total
number of rural workers remaining in the economy's primary sectors was
nearly depleted, yielding only 730,000 of the needed workers.'0 By the late
1980s, Japan faced a serious domestic labor shortage as even alternative
sources of labor-such as women, older workers, and the self-employed-
were diminishing."'
As the robust economy provided upward mobility for Japanese
employees, it also raised the expectations of workers (particularly young
Japanese), who increasingly viewed blue-collar work as unattractive and
distasteful.12  Businesses, especially construction, low-technology
manufacturing, and value-added service industries, had difficulty attracting
employees willing to work long hours doing labor-intensive work for low
wages.' 3 The domestic labor shortage was and continues to be particularly
threatening to small and medium-sized firms that supply components to
larger industries, because their survival depends on keeping wages down and
remaining competitive with firms abroad.
14
2. Domestic Demographic Crisis
The problem of Japan's domestic labor shortage is expected to worsen
into the future due to a declining fertility rate and an increasingly aging
population.' 5 For decades, Japan's fertility rates have been among the
lowest in the world. 6 Proportionately, Japan's aging population continues
9 For example, between 1960 and 1973, the industrial sector was able to draw 5.2 million workers
from agriculture. See PAPADEMETRIOU & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 10.
IUSee id. at 11.
'~Id.12 As a result, the labor shortage became more acute in the positions that were comparatively lower
in status and pay. This is particularly true for the "3D" jobs (or in Japanese the "3K" jobs)-the dirty
(kitanai), dangerous (kiken), and difficult (kitsut)-which native workers shun. Myron Weiner, Opposing
Visions: Migration and Citizenship Policies in Japan and the United States, in TEMPORARY WORKERS OR
FUTURE CrnIZENs? JAPANESE AND U.S. MIGRATION POLICIES 3, 10 (Myron Weiner & Tadashi Hanami
eds., 1998) [hereinafter TEMPORARY WORKERS OR FUTURE CIZENs?].
13 PAPADEMETRIOU & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 11-12. Even when firms offered signing bonuses
and other benefits to recruit workers in various lower-wage job categories, interest continued to decline.
See C.S. Manegold, Hang Up the Help Wanted Sign, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 1990, at 39, LEXIS, News
Group File.
Takashi Machimura, Local Settlement Patterns of Foreign Workers in Greater Tokyo: Growing
Diversity and Its Consequences, in JAPAN AND GLOBAL MIGRATION: FOREIGN WORKERS AND THE ADVENT
OF A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 176, 186 (Mike Douglass & Glenda S. Roberts eds., 2000) [hereinafter
JAPAN AND GLOBAL MIGRATION].
15 Japan Economic Council, Report of the Globalization Committee, On Globalization and the
World Economy in 2010, § 5.3 (1998), at http://www5.cao.go.jp/98/e/19980416e-gurovari-e.html (last
visited Dec. 3, 2001); Basic Plan, supra note 4, pt. I.
16 In 1950, Japan's fertility rate (the average number of children a woman will have in her lifetime)
stood at 3.65; by 2001, it became the lowest in the world, plummeting to 1.38. See GLOBAL NEWS WIRE,
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to increase.17 According to a United Nations report released in March 2000,
Japan would have to accept 17 million foreigners between 1995 and 2050 to
maintain its current population level.18
Given the demographic changes of the past decades, the labor force is
estimated to decrease by 1.76 million, or 2.6%, by 2010.19 The service
sector, including care for the aged, and the construction industry, are
expected to face labor shortages in the future.20  As the domestic labor pool
dries up, employers will continue to seek workers from abroad.21 It is
estimated that the Japanese economy may need 500,000 additional workers
each year after 2000. Although the current economic recession has driven
wages in Japan down somewhat, wages in the manufacturing sector continue
to be much higher than comparable wages in neighboring countries, thereby
acting as a continuous "pull" factor for labor migration to Japan.
23
B. Government Ban On the Entry of Unskilled Workers
With the depletion of traditional reservoirs of labor and the
unwillingness of young Japanese to do unskilled work, coupled with the
STATESMAN (INDIA), Times Out of Joint, May 7, 2001, LEXIS, Asia Pacific Regional Files. Innovative
incentives have been offered to either encourage couples to have children or lure families with many
children. For example, Higashimura, a small rice farming village 100 miles northeast of Tokyo, offered
housing plots at giveaway prices to seven families that move there with young children or proof of a
"blossoming pregnancy." See Kathryn Tolbert, In Japanese Village, a Plot to Lure Newcomers, WASH.
POST, Oct. 29, 1999, at A23, LEXIS, News Group File. The proposal is dramatic, given the high value of
land in Japan. Id.
17 Japan has the highest life expectancy in the world: 77 years for men and 84 years for women. See
Times Out of Joint, supra note 16. The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research
estimated in 1997 that the Japanese population would start declining after it peaks in 2007. See Kumi
Matsumaru & Tom Westin, Time to Open the Floodgates?: Japan Rethinks Foreign Labor, DAILY
YOMIURI, Oct. 5, 2001, LEXIS, Japan Country Files. However, Japan's fertility rate has been declining
faster than initially forecasted, leading some analysts to predict that the population in Japan will peak
sooner. A continued population decline could result in a decrease from 125 million in 1997 to 100 million
in 2050, and then to 67 million in 2100, which is the same level as in 1933 when Japan was not yet
industrialized. Id.
18 See Matsumaru & Westin, supra note 17.
19 See Kazutoshi Koshiro, Does Japan Need Immigrants?, in TEMPORARY WORKERS OR FUTURE
CITIZENS?, supra note 12, at 151, 155.
20 Id. at 159.
21 Since the onset of the recession in 1991, Japan's unemployment rate has been increasing, reaching
4.5% in 2000. See Doug Struck & Kathryn Tolbert, Japan Inc. Workers Get Harsh Dose of Economic
Reality; High Jobless Rate Gives Rise to Homeless Camps, Suicides, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2000, at A14,
LEXIS, News Group File. Although this seems low in comparison to U.S. standards, the official
unemployment rate among men aged 24 or younger is 10.7%, but analysts say this is a conservative
measurement. Id. However, the recession has not significantly affected the sectors with "3D" jobs, which
are still plagued with a labor shortage. Koshiro, supra note 19, at 153.
22 See Koshiro, supra note 19, at 159.
2' Id. at 155.
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looming demographic crisis projected to exacerbate the labor shortage, it
seemed that importation of foreign labor was the government's best option.
The government was constrained from doing so, however, because Japan's
Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act ("Immigration Control
Act"), bans the entry of unskilled foreigners. 24
Desperate for survival, small manufacturing and construction
industries began to recruit foreign labor illegally, notwithstanding the
government prohibition on the employment of unskilled guest workers.25
Employing low-paid illegal migrants was easier for many companies than
investing in high-technology equipment,26 and the enforcement provisions of
the immigration law at that time had no teeth to act as a significant deterrent
27to employer noncompliance.
The influx of male migrant workers fueled a national debate between
business, the public, and the government over whether to legalize the entry
of unskilled labor.28  At the same time, Japanese Brazilian politicians in
Brazil had been lobbying the Japanese government to facilitate the entry of
Japanese descendants to Japan.
C. Lobbying Efforts by Japanese Brazilian Politicians for Facilitating
Immigration of Nikkeijin to Japan
During the decade prior to the 1990 amendments to the Immigration
Control Act, Japanese Brazilian politicians lobbied the Japanese government
to create a residency category for Japanese descendants without Japanese
citizenship. The idea was perceived as a win-win situation for both
countries, as the Nikkeijins' increasing desire to find work in Japan
coincided nicely with the Japanese employers' need for unskilled laborers.30
24 See Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Cabinet Order No. 319 of 1951, amended
by Law No. 135 of 1999, art. 19(1), provisional translation (Japan), http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISHIEB/ib-
20.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Immigration Control Act].
2 Weiner, supra note 12, at 11.
26Id.
27 As a result, to enforce employer compliance with the prohibition on the employment of unskilled
foreign workers, the 1990 amendments to the Immigration Control Act included sanctions and fines. See
Immigration Control Act, arts. 5(1), 5(9). The sanctions impose fines of up to two million yen ($20,000)
and/or imprisonment of up to three years. Id.
28 Sumi Shin, Global Migration: The Impact of "Newcomers" on Japanese Immigration and Labor
Systems, 19 BERK. J. INT'LL. 265,276-77 (2001).
29 Keiko Yamanaka, Return Migration of Japanese Brazilians to Japan: The Nikkeijin as Ethnic
Minority and Political Construct, 5 DIAsPORA 65, 74-76 (1996) [hereinafter Yamanaka, Return Migration
of Japanese Brazilians to Japan].
o Id.
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The practical consequences of emigration from Japan and
requirements under Japan's Nationality Law created a situation where
second and third generation Nikkeijin in South America were left without
Japanese nationality. In 1908, 781 Japanese immigrants arrived at the port
of Santos, Brazil, marking the commencement of Japanese immigration to
Latin America for nearly a century.31  It was not until the rnid-1980s that
Japanese Brazilians began leaving Brazil to avoid the hyper-inflation and
unemployment that had plagued Brazil throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
32
Nikkeijin who immigrated to Japan during the 1980s were mostly middle
aged and older individuals who spoke fluent Japanese-issei (first
generation) and some nissei (second generation) immigrants-and who
retained Japanese citizenship. 33  Younger Brazilian-born, Portuguese-
speaking nissei and sansei (third generation), however, faced a legal barrier
to entry because they did not hold Japanese citizenship. 34 As a result, under
31 See Keiko Yamanaka, "I Will Go Home, but When?": Labor Migration and Circular Diaspora
Formation by Japanese Brazilians in Japan, in JAPAN AND GLOBAL MIGRATION, supra note 14, at 123,
128. Prior to the fall of the feudal Tokugawa government in 1868, Japanese were not allowed to emigrate.
Id. at 127. The first group of Japanese immigrants left for Hawaii in 1885 to work as contract laborers until
about 1908, when immigration was diverted to Latin America. l. Brazil was experiencing an acute labor
shortage due to its then recent abolition of slavery and rising demand for coffee exports. Id. Unlike the
Japanese immigrants to North America who were mostly men, immigrants to South America consisted of
families. Id. at 128. Initially, Japanese immigrated to Brazil with the intention of working as short-term
migrant laborers and returning to Japan with money saved. Sellek, supra note 1, at 187. However, low
wages and exploitative practices by employers postponed return migration, and after Japan's defeat in the
Second World War most immigrants decided to settle permanently in Brazil. Yamanaka, at 128-29.
Japanese immigration to Peru also took place at the turn of the twentieth century, but took place on a
smaller scale than immigration to Brazil. Kathryn Tolbert, Defiant Fujimori Finds Safe Haven Among
Japanese; Peru's Ex-Leader Uses Net as Outlet, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2001, at A17, LEXIS, News Group
File; Tony Laszlo, Japan's Homogenous Diversity, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, LEXIS, Japan Country
Files.
32 See Yamanaka, supra note 31, at 132. Economic decline was not isolated to Brazil; other South
American countries had also been experiencing high inflation and large national debts. Sellek, supra note
1, at 187.
33 See Yamanaka, supra note 31, at 132.
3 See id. Japan's Nationality Law is based on the principle of jus sanguinis (law of blood) and
requires that a child's birth be recorded in the Japanese registry within fourteen days after birth in order for
the child to be granted citizenship. See Nationality Law, No. 147, 1950, amended by Law No. 268, 1952
and Law No. 45, 1984, art. 12 (Japan) [hereinafter Nationality Law]. This is in contrast to nationality laws
following the principle ofjus soli (law of the soil), under which citizenship is granted if the birth took place
in the jurisdiction of the country. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CrrIZENSHIP 21 (4th ed. 1998). The United States, for example, follows either principle: citizenship is
granted if either the birth takes place in the United States or if one of the parents is an American citizen. Id.
at 25-27. Prior to World War II, immigrant parents, hoping to return to Japan, registered their children
(nisseis) in the Japanese government offices that existed in Brazil. Adriana Capuano de Oliveira, Japanese
in Brazil or Brazilians in Japan? The Identity Issue Inside of a Migratory Context 9, 12 (paper presented at
the Conference Cultural Encounters Between Latin America and the Pacific Rim, Mar. 6-7, 1998), at
http://orpheus.ucsd.edu/las/studies/pdfs/capuano.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2002). Because Brazil's
nationality law recognizes dual nationality, these nissei were also Brazilian citizens. After Japan's
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the Japanese Nationality Law, these nissei and sansei were defined as
foreigners despite their Japanese ancestry.
In 1989, the Japanese government revised its Immigration Control
Act, which took effect on June 1, 1990. 35  The new law represents the
government's attempt to kill two birds with one stone: to satisfy small-scale
employers' demand for unskilled labor without compromising official policy
against accepting such workers; and to preserve the notion of a monoethnic
Japan.36 The government believed that Nikkeijin, "as relatives of the
Japanese, would -be able to assimilate into Japanese society regardless of
nationality and language," whereas the country's homogeneity might be
spoiled "if Japan admitted many Asians with different cultures and customs
than those of Japanese." 37  Thus, Nikkeijin immigrating to Japan were
characterized by the Japanese government as "returning" to their home
country, despite the fact that most of the immigrants-second and third
generation Japanese descendants-had never before set foot in Japan.
III. JAPANESE DESCENDANTS FROM ABROAD "RETuRN" To JAPAN UNDER
THE REVISED IMMIGRATION CONTROL ACT
A. The 1990 Amendments
The 1990 revisions to the Immigration Control Act provided for
tougher enforcement to crack down on illegal foreign workers, while at the
same time creating openings in Japan's immigration system to alleviate
some of the country's labor needs. The revised law criminalized an
undocumented entrant's residence in Japan, imposing fines or imprisonment
38and extending the ban on reentry from one to five years. The amendments
also introduced sanctions against agents who recruit and employers who hire
undocumented migrants.39  Despite these amplified enforcement efforts,
unauthorized migration has not decreased significantly.40 Modest decreases
surrender in 1945, the idea of returning to Japan became less plausible, and consequently many parents no
longer registered their children as Japanese citizens. Id at 12.
35 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Cabinet Order No. 319 of 1951, amended by
Law No. 135 of 1999, provisional translation (Japan), http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISHIB/ib-20.html (last
visited Jan. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Immigration Control Act].
36 Shin, supra note 28, at 279.
37 See Yamanaka, Return Migration of Japanese Brazilians to Japan, supra note 29, at 76, quoting
Toshihiko Mojima.
39 See Immigration Control Act, arts. 5(1), 5(9). For example, the sanctions impose fines of up to
two million yen ($20,000) and/or imprisonment of up to three years. Id.
'9 See id., art. 73-2.
40 SOPEMI, Trends in International Migration, Annual Report for the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development 164 (1999). The number of illegal foreign workers is estimated to be at
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in illegal migration have been more than offset by the increase in two
sources of legal unskilled migration: trainees and Nikkeijin.4 1
The revised Immigration Control Act altered and expanded most
forms of temporary immigration categories, stretching the "statuses of
residence" from sixteen to twenty-seven categories.42 In particular, the 1990
amendments created a separate "trainee" status43 for admitting unskilled
foreigners who participate in the trainee program.44 Commentators have
suggested that the trainee system enables the government to establish a
controlled, legal mechanism for unskilled labor.45 The amendments also
lifted some of the employment restrictions for foreign students, who have
been another source of unskilled labor.46 The policy change that has most
significantly affected the labor market, however, is the creation of a new
residency category that permits Nikkeijin to immigrate to Japan without bars
on employment.
least 270,000 as of March 2000, but because of their clandestine nature, the actual figure is expected to be
much higher. See Basic Plan, supra note 4, pt. 11.1(1). Employers' demands for unskilled foreign labor
continue to exist, and such demands are readily satisfied by criminal organizations that are becoming
increasingly sophisticated at falsifying documents and smuggling workers into Japan. Shin, supra note 28,
at 283. In addition, foreign workers overstaying their visas have become commonplace. Tokyo District Is
Home Away from Home; Asian Immigrants Flock to Area. in Shinjuku; Longtime Resident View Influx with
Mixed Feelings, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Sept. 30, 1996, LEXIS, Japan Country Files. Although local
governments are required to report visa overstayers to the central government, cooperation with the
Immifration Bureau and police has been minimal. Id.
PAPADEMETRIOU & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 40.42 See Shin, supra note 28, at 279; Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Cabinet Order
No. 319 of 1951, amended by Law No. 135 of 1999, Ibis., provisional translation (Japan),
http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/IB/ib-20.htnl (last visited Jan. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Immigration ControlAct].
43 Immigration Control Act, art. 7(l)(2). Previously, the trainee status of residence was under a
provision for overseas students, i.e., Immigration Control Act, article 4(l)(6)(2). Shin, supra note 28, at
316.
4 The government's stated purpose for creating the trainee program was to promote cooperation
with developing countries by transferring skills and know-how to unskilled foreign workers from other
Asian countries. Katsuko Terasawa, Labor Law, Civil Law, Immigration Law and the Reality of
Immigrants and Their Children, in JAPAN AND GLOBAL MIGRATION, supra note 14, at 219, 227. Under the
trainee program, small- and medium-sized Japanese firms without an overseas presence are given
permission to bring in unskilled workers as "trainees." PAPADEMETRIOU & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 40.
The program requires that at least one-third of the trainee's time is spent receiving classroom instruction,
which includes Japanese language education and basic skills training-but these are sometimes never
carried out. HIROSHI KOMAI, MIGRANT WORKERS IN JAPAN 37 (Jens Wilkinson trans., 1995). Trainees are
prohibited from engaging in employment, but they may work in the name of on-the-job training. Shin,
supra note 28, at 316. Consequently, "many foreign workers have been employed under the guise of
trainees in order to compensate for the labor shortage . . . [and have been] force[d] [sic] to work as
unskilled laborers under the pretext of being in training." Terasawa, at 227. In fact, revisions were made in
1992 that reduced time required in the classroom and increased time spent training on-the-job. Shin, supra
note 28, at 316.
45 PAPADEMETRIOU & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 40.
46 KOMAI, supra note 44, at 54.
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B. The Creation of a New "Long Term Resident" Status and the Increase
in Entrants as "Spouse or Child of Japanese National"
The new provisions of the 1990 Immigration Control Act were
specifically targeted at Nikkeijin living in South America.47  The
amendments created a legal opening permitting second or third generation
descendants of Japanese citizens to immigrate to Japan. 48  Under the new
provisions, Nikkeijin and their families were granted rights of employment
and residence for an initial period of up to three years with extensions
thereafter.49 The provision creating the new "long term resident" status went
hand-in-hand with the provisions granting additional rights to "spouses or
children of Japanese nationals." 50 Although the provisions permit spouses
and children of Japanese nationals to stay for up to one year, they can remain
longer because an "extension of stay" for these categories is easily
obtained.5' Thus, Nikkeijin could immigrate to Japan with their families and
remain for extended periods of time. In contrast, immigrants who enter as
"trainees" are prohibited from bringing family members with them and must
return to their home countries in two or three years.
52
Not surprisingly, the number of Nikkeijin migrating to Japan increased
rapidly after passage of the revised Immigration Control Act.53 In 1991, the
number of registered foreigners claiming "long term resident" status reached
96,377, increasing to 211,275 at the end of 1998.54 Brazilians and
47 See discussion supra Part II.C.
48 Sellek, supra note 1. at 184.
49 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Cabinet Order No. 319 of 1951, amended by
Law No. 135 of 1999, art.21, provisional translation (Japan), http://www.moj.go.jpIENGLISH/IB/ib-
20.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Immigration Control Act].
" The number of individuals entering as a "spouse or child of Japanese national" has been
increasing. See Basic Plan, supra note 4, pt. 1.1(4). This trend reflects a rise in the number of
international marriages, as well as a rise in the number of entries by Japanese descendants. There are also a
considerable number of cases in which foreigners, who married Japanese nationals after entry into Japan,
changed their status of residence to "spouse or child of Japanese national." By the end of 1998, the number
of registered foreign residents under this status stood at 264,844 and accounted for about 17.5% of the total
number of registered foreigners. hL
51 Immigration Control Act, art. 21; Yamanaka, supra note 31, at 133.
52 World Migration Report: 2000, International Organization for Migration, United Nations 65-66
(2000). By prohibiting Asian trainees from immigrating with their families, the design of Japan's
immigration policy is to ensure that their stay is temporary. See PAPADEMEMTROU & HAMILTON, supra note
2, at 41-42. This illustrates the government's perception of Nikkeijin as somehow more "Japanese" by
virtue of having Japanese descent; thus expressing preferential treatment over other Asian migrants.
53 See Basic Plan, supra note 4, pt. 11.1(4).
54 See id. The Nikkeijin influx subsided by 1996, after which repeat arrivals circulated between
Japan and Latin America. Yamanaka, supra note 31, at 134. Nonetheless, on the whole, the Nikkeijin
population in Japan has grown tremendously in the last decade, and many have decided to settle
permanently in Japan where they are better off economically than in Latin America. Id. It remains to be
seen how many more will decide to immigrate to Japan, given that an additional one million Japanese-
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Peruvians, most of whom are of Japanese descent, now constitute the third
largest foreign population in Japan after Koreans at 700,000 and Chinese at
220,000. 55
While South American Nikkeijin immigrate to Japan under the new
immigration category created by the central government, their integration
into Japanese society is facilitated by the local governments, as discussed
below in Part V. Consequently, their legal rights are bifurcated. As legal
foreign residents, South American Nikkeijin enjoy certain rights as local
residents in the cities in which they live and work; yet, because most of them
are not Japanese nationals, the scope of their constitutional rights is
determined by the central government. Because municipal and prefectural
governments have considerable delegated autonomy in making regulations,
some local governments have established policies and programs that
accommodate for aliens' ethnic differences. However, because Japan is a
unitary system, the scope of eligibility for local accommodation policies is
determined by the central government. These issues are further discussed
below in Part VI.
C. Nikkeijin As Legal Unskilled Laborers
Once Nikkeijin arrive in Japan, they settle in non-metropolitan
industrial zones and work as manual laborers. In 1995, almost fifty percent
of the registered Brazilians in Japan were concentrated in five non-
metropolitan prefectures: Aichi (home of Toyota Motor Corp.), Shizuoka
(southwest of Tokyo), Kanagawa (west of Tokyo), Saitama (north of
56Tokyo), and Gunma (central Japan). Within these prefectures, Nikkeijin
live in working-class cities and towns where manufacturing companies are
located. 57 Over two-thirds of Nikkei Brazilian men and half of the Nikkei
Brazilian women work as machine operators assembling automobile and
Brazilians currently live in Brazil, and about 80,000 Japanese-Peruvians in Peru. Mario Osava, Nikkei
Leave Brazil to Meet the Rising Sun, ASIA TIAEs, Mar. 6, 2002, http://www.atimes.comijapan-
econ/DC06Dh01 .html (last visited Apr. 20, 2002); Tolbert, supra note 31; Laszlo, supra note 31.
55 See Yamanaka, supra note 31, at 134.
56 See Masami Wada, Japan Learns from Its Latin Links: Immigrants From Peru, Brazil Contribute
To "Internationalization, " NIKKE WEEKLY, Apr. 25, 1994, at 24, LEXIS, Japan Country Files.
57 Sellek, supra note 1, at 193.
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electric appliance parts in factories.58  By 1998, the Japanese government
estimated that 234,100 Nikkeijin were legally employed in Japan.
59
For the Nikkeijin, working as contract laborers in Japan represented
economic advancement but downward social mobility. Nikkeijin came from
well-educated, middle-class strata of Latin American society and held jobs
as engineers, lawyers, dentists, secretaries, sales clerks, and teachers. But in
Japan, because of their inability to speak Japanese, Nikkeijin engaged in
work that required physical strength and on-the-job experience but no
complex technical or communication skills.60 Despite this demotion in job
status, Nikkeijin earned more money working as unskilled laborers in Japan
than as professionals in Latin America. For example, the daily wage for
unskilled labor in Japan was eauivalent to a month's salary as a skilled
worker or professional in Brazil.
In sum, because maintaining a restrictive immigration policy remains
a tenet of the central government, the 1990 amendments to the Immigration
Control Act did not legalize unskilled foreign labor. The revised law did,
however, essentially open a "back door" for importing foreign labor under
culturally acceptable and economically feasible methods while preserving
the government's ban on admitting unskilled foreign workers. Specifically,
the effect of the 1990 amendments was to create a legal opening for the
Japanese government to import Nikkeijin as unskilled labor under a
culturally acceptable national immigration policy.
IV. NIKKEIJIN EXPERIENCE DIFFICULTIES INTEGRATING INTO JAPANESE
SOCIETY
A. Despite Their Japanese Ancestry, Returnees are Linguistically and
Culturally Non-Japanese
The Japanese soon realized that most Nikkeijin were not the Japanese
they expected, but "foreigners" who neither speak Japanese nor adhere to
Japanese norms and customs. Spanish or Portuguese is their first language,
and many second, third, or fourth-generation Nikkeijin cannot speak
58 See Yamanaka, supra note 31, at 135. For employers, Nikkeijin employees are desirable because
of their "disposability," or their availability to be "hired and returned to their employment brokers on short
notice and without incurring any future obligations, damaging the company's image, or restricting future
access to foreign workers." Id.
59 See SOPEMI, supra note 40, at 164.
60 Yamanaka, supra note 31, at 140.
61 See id. at 141. For example, in 1995 professional Nikkeijin in Brazil earned on the average
between $210 and $350 per month. Id. Compare this to over $100 per day for an unskilled male factory
worker in Japan between 1988 and 1991. laE
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Japanese. 62 Added to this linguistic difference, Nikkeijin are culturally Latin
American.63 Their patterns of behavior and daily habits are in direct
contradiction to those of Japanese, who value conformity and discipline. 64
For example, Nikkeijin greet one another by kissing on the cheek, and
couples express physical affection in public by holding hands, hugging, and
kissing. 65  Such behavior would be unheard of by most Japanese, who
generally behave with caution and reserve. Culinary preferences, one of the
most fundamental aspects of ethnic identity and, therefore, one of the most
difficult to modify, are also different: Brazilian Nikkeijin crave rice, beans,
steak, and salad. In addition, although they share physical features similar to
Japanese, Nikkeijin's Latin American background can be easily identified
through such subtleties as body language and dress.66
Nikkeijin experience widespread prejudice and discrimination by
Japanese because of their ethnic difference or lack of "Japaneseness." 67 For
example, because of Nikkeijin's Japanese ancestry, Japanese employers tend
to expect them to behave and speak like Japanese, but when these
expectations are contradicted, the Japanese "often verbally abuse them,
calling them stupid, secondary Japanese and uncivilized people from a
backward country."
68
Having grown up as "Japanese" in Brazil, Nikkeijin's self-identity is
seriously challenged when they are regarded as "Brazilians" in Japan. In
Brazil, second and third generation Nikkeijin are considered to be "Japanese"
because of their Asian appearance. In Japan, these same Nikkeijin are
considered to be "Brazilian" or non-Japanese because, despite their physical
similarity to Japanese, they speak and behave differently. 69 The social
62 Oliveira, supra note 34, at 20. Some second generation Nikkeijin learned to speak Japanese from
their parents. Id However, contrary to the Japanese language of their parent's generation, Japanese today
contains many English expressions that are impossible to identify for those who learned old Japanese. 1d2
Further, most first generation Japanese who immigrated to South America were farmers from rural areas of
Japan, where different dialects of Japanese are spoken. Id Thus, even for those Nikkeijin who can speak
the language, they are culturally alienated nonetheless. Id.
63 For example, in the town of Oizumi, where almost 12% of the residents are from Latin America,
Nikkeijin "parade through town dressed in feathers and G-strings to a pounding samba beat" at the town's
annual summer carnival. George Wehrfritz & Hideko Takayama, The Japan That Can Say Yes,
NEWSWEEK, June 5, 2000, at 38, LEXIS, News Group Files.
Mikiko Miyakawa & Kakuya Ishida, Growing Diversity Brings Challenges, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct.
19, 2001, LEXIS, Japan Country Files.
65 Oliveira, supra note 34, at 20.
6 As one commentator remarks, it is possible to determine that a person is Brazilian, and not
Japanese, "from miles distance, without the need to hear the person speaking Portuguese" by noticing
his/her clothes, the way he/she walks, or the use of hand gestures as heshe speaks. Id. at 21.
67 Id. at 23.
" See Yamanaka, supra note 31, at 141.
69 Mario Osava, Population Brazil: Emigrants Seek Red Sun of Japanese Ancestors, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Feb. 26, 2002, LEXIS, News Group File.
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rejection by the people they thought of as fellow Japanese leaves Nikkeijin
feeling confused and deeply hurt. Many Nikkeijin poignantly expressed their
sense of cultural alienation from both Japan and Brazil: "In Brazil, we were
called Japongs, but in Japan we became gaijin7° (foreigners) or Burajiru-jin
(Brazilians). No matter where we go, we Nikkeijin, have no home.",7' As a
result, they find solace by forming their own ethnic community-in other
words, "a community of people who share a common ethnic background and
relate to one another through work, family, and friendship."
72
Besides providing moral support, these ethnic communities supply
Nikkeijin with all their material and cultural needs. Most Nikkeijin are able
to shop for imported Brazilian items, eat at Brazilian restaurants, and enjoy
Brazilian entertainment by patronizing small ethnic businesses that have
mushroomed since their arrival in 1990.73 To meet the demands of the
growing Brazilian population, other kinds of commercial and cultural
establishments have also been opening up.
74
In sum, instead of blending into Japanese society unnoticed, Nikkeijin
have formed their own ethnic enclaves, creating for themselves a unique
place in society where they are neither completely "Japanese" nor entirely
"foreign." Rather than integrating into Japanese society as ethnic Japanese,
Nikkeijin are, in fact, ethnic minorities. Cultural and linguistic differences
have made the day-to-day lives of Nikkeijin a challenge, particularly when
dealing in matters of housing, education, and social services.
70 Gaijin literally means "outside person." Millie Creighton, Soto Others and Uchi Others: Imaging
Racial Diversity, Imagining Homogeneous Japan, in JAPAN'S MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION OF
HOMOGENEITY, supra note 1, at 211-12. The various terms used in reference to a foreigner illustrates
Japanese conceptualizations of different "others":
Although the word gaijin can be applied to any non-Japanese person it is most commonly only
used for white foreigners, who are conceptualized as "pure gaijin," or "true gaijin." Japanese
tend to use the word gaijin only for Whites, while the term gaikokujin (person from an outside
country) is used for Blacks and non-Japanese Asians. Blacks are also called kokujin, while other
Asians are called Ajiajin, or referred to by the country of their origin (e.g., Chrigokujin for a
Chinese person).
Iat
71 See Yamanaka, supra note 31, at 142.
72 See id. at 143.
73 These small retail stores are mostly run by Nikkeijin entrepreneurs and sell all the comforts of
home: "imported Brazilian food, drinks, snacks, clothes, cosmetics, books, magazines, newspapers, videos,
tapes and compact discs." Id at 143.
14 Such establishments include "discos, banks, travel agents, Japanese language schools,
employment services, legal consultation, hobby and sports clubs, catering services, day-care services, and
more." Id.
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B. Linguistic and Cultural Barriers to Social Integration
1. Housing
Finding housing in Japan is the most serious problem for foreigners,
including Nikkeijin.75 In addition to having to pay a large deposit to rent an
apartment, the prospective foreign tenant must also find a Japanese
guarantor. 76  Moreover, many Japanese landlords are reluctant to rent to
foreigners.7 7 The friction between Japanese and non-Japanese cultures is
most apparent in the context of residential life, where rules of behavior and
cooperation govern personal interactions. The troubles caused by cultural
differences in daily life between Japanese and foreign residents are most
apparent in Toyota city's Homi Danchi, a mammoth public housing complex
that is home to 11,000 tenants-3,000 of whom are Nikkeijin.78
The clash of cultures is mitigated through the use of posters and
pamphlets in Portuguese setting forth a list of housing rules and other
information about the Japanese way of life.7 9 For example, Japanese and
Nikkeijin residents have had frequent disputes over noise, garbage disposal,
bicycle parking, and other daily issues. 8 Tension mounted to violence in a
1999 incident in which some Japanese residents, who were also members of
a right-wing organization, publicly demanded that Nikkei Brazilians leave,
one day after a ramen stall on the premises was smashed by one or more
unidentified culprits.81  The next day a car belonging to one of the right-
wingers was set on fire.82 This compelled the Toyota city government to
establish a multicultural committee two years later.83  Although Homi
Danchi represents the worst clash between Japanese residents and
75 Takamnichi Kajita, The Challenge of Incorporating Foreigners in Japan: "Ethnic Japanese" and
"'Sociological Japanese," in TEMPORARY WORKERS OR FUTURE CrrIZENS?, supra note 12, at 120, 129.
76 Id.
77 Tadashi Hanami, Japanese Policies on the Rights and Benefits Granted to Foreign Workers,
Residents, Refugees and Illegals, in TEMPORARY WORKERS OR FUTURE CITIZENS?, supra note 12, at 211,
233. 78 See Miyakawa & Ishida, supra note 64. Component suppliers for Toyota Motor Corporation and
other automobile-related companies rented rooms for non-Japanese workers, mostly Nikkeijin, in Homi
Danchi as a job benefit. Id.
79 The residential rules range from "Don't turn up your television or radio early in the morning or
late at night" to "Don't barbecue on the balcony." See id. Other notices, such as a wide banner placed on
both sides of pedestrian bridge, inform of traffic safety in Portuguese and Japanese. Id.
so Id.
81 Id.
82 id.
83 Id. The committee was formed to discuss education, social welfare, and medical service issues.
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newcomers, similar situations have arisen elsewhere in Japan, particularly in
localities with large foreign populations.
2. Education
Since the language barrier between Nikkeijin and Japanese is the
primary obstacle to social integration, education is undoubtedly the biggest
concern for both municipalities and Nikkeijin.84 Nikkeijin migration to Japan
has predominantly been in the form of family migration, and Nikkeijin
children attend local Japanese elementary and junior high schools.85 As the
Nikkeijin population has grown over the last decade, providing education to
non-Japanese speaking children of Nikkeijin has been a major concern for
several municipalities.86  In 1992, approximately 20,000 Nikkeijin children
did not know how to speak Japanese. The Japanese education system was
unprepared to deal with non-Japanese speaking students. 88  Consequently,
local governments are devising teaching materials and a guidebook for
89Japanese language instruction. In regions without significant numbers of
Nikkeijin, no specialized curriculum for non-Japanese students has been
introduced in those schools.90 More importantly, because foreign children
are not subject to compulsory elementary and lower secondary-level
education, some Nikkeijin parents do not send their children to local schools,
or children drop out of school if they cannot adjust.9' Thus, a larger concern
is the possibility that some children might turn to juvenile delinquency if
92they do not attend schools.
84 Id.
85 Kajita, supra note 75, at 129.
86 Keiichi Imai, Schools Learn to Deal with Immigrant Children; Number of Foreign Pupils
Expected to Rise Significantly, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Apr. 4, 1992, at 20, LEXIS, Japan Country Files. This is
especially true for Aichi, Gunma, Kanagawa, Saitama, Shizuoka, and Tochigi prefectures, which rely
heavil on foreign labor and which therefore have substantial foreign family residents. Id.
IT See Sellek, supra note 1, at 196.
88 Imai, supra note 86. Teachers did not have any guidelines or materials for teaching non-Japanese
speaking children. Id.
89 Id. Consonant with the goal of providing bilingual education, some Japanese commentators also
recognized the need to respect and preserve foreigners' ethnic differences. Sakoto Nozawa, Multicultural,
Multilingual Japan: Is It Possible?, DAILY YOMIURI, Sept. 4, 1995, at 8, LEXIS, Japan Country Files.
They urge that a "system should be established in public schools to provide non-Japanese children with the
opportunity to learn Japanese as a second language and maintain their native language and cultures." Id.
90 Kajita, supra note 75, at 129.
91 Miyakawa & Ishida, supra note 64.
92 Id. As one middle-aged Nikkeijin resident commented: "Most South Americans who came to
Japan immediately after 1990 understood Japanese culture because they often heard about it from their
parents. But the numbers of young people who do not know about Japanese culture have gradually
increased and many of them have no intention of learning the Japanese language or laws. As a result, they
drop out of school or quit working, although most [older Nikkeijin] work hard to save money." Id.
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In addition, as more Nikkeijin families migrate and eventually
permanently settle in Japan, educational authorities will have to address the
problem of limited access to senior high schools and universities, since not
all of these schools can accommodate foreign students who do not possess
sufficient knowledge of the Japanese language. 93 This is a serious problem
for older Nikkeijin children who, because they have inadequate preparation,
cannot successfully compete with Japanese students.94 Although private
international schools offer classes taught in foreign languages, these
institutions have high tuition rates that deter many foreign workers from
enrolling their children.95 Because one's educational background carries
much weight in Japanese society, older Nikkeijin children without Japanese
higher education follow their parents into unskilled labor.
96
3. Social Services
Municipal governments face two main issues with respect to
providing social services: first, how to provide medical services and
pensions to non-Japanese residents, many of whom are reluctant to join
company health insurance and pension schemes; and second, what to do
about those who remain uninsured and ineligible to receive pensions when
they retire.97 Health insurance is available to all residents of a local
community, including foreigners, under the National Health Insurance Law
("NHIL"), provided they submit an application and pay fees at the local
community offices. 98 Employees of private employers with more than five
workers are subject to the Health Insurance Law ("HIL"), which confers
better benefits than the NHIL.99 However, many foreign residents cannot
meet the strict qualifications for membership in the plan. While providing
medical service to non-Japanese who have not joined company health
insurance plans is undoubtedly a problem for municipal governments, a
greater issue is the non-membership of illegal foreign workers. Because
illegal foreign workers do not join the NHIL plan, and because their
93 Sellek, supra note 1, at 197.
94 Kajita, supra note 75, at 130.
95 Imai, supra note 86.
96 Kajita, supra note 75, at 130.
97 Miyakawa & Ishida, supra note 64.
98 Hanami, supra note 77, at 226. The NHIL of 1958 was amended in 1986 to eliminate the
citizenship requirement, thus making health insurance available to all local residents except foreigners
living in Japan less than one year. Id.
9 Id.
10 Kakuya Ishida, Giving Foreign Residents a Voice, DAILY YOMIURI, Jan. 6, 2001, at 7, LEXIS,
Japan Country Files.
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employers do not pay fees under the HIL, doctors and hospitals are left with
large unpaid medical bills incurred by such illegal foreign workers.10 1
Linguistic barriers between Nikkeijin patients and Japanese doctors
have caused problems for hospitals. Hospitals do not always have
interpreters, and not all interpreters have sufficient medical knowledge. To
facilitate communication between doctors and Brazilian patients, a Japanese-
Brazilian physician recently compiled a Portuguese-Japanese dictionary that
contains over 4,400 medical terms.1° 2 In addition, to help alleviate stress-
related medical problems associated with culture shock, one Nikkeijin doctor
began counseling Nikkeijin over the telephone through the sponsorship of
the Brazilian consulate in Nagoya.103
With respect to determining the eligibility for receiving pensions, the
National Pension Law of 1959 was amended in 1982 to eliminate citizenship
as a requirement, thereby extending pension coverage to registered
foreigners. 104 Also, employees of companies subject to the Welfare Pension
Law of 1947 are covered by the Welfare Pension Scheme. 105 Despite these
existing pension opportunities, foreigners were often not entitled to pensions
because the plan required twenty-five years of service and foreigners' brief
period of membership did not qualify.' °6 The law was changed in 1994
making it possible for foreigners to receive a lump-sum payment within two
months of their departure from Japan. 107 Notwithstanding this change in the
law and the fact that many Nikkeijin who migrate to Japan intend to settle
there permanently, they are still reluctant to join a pension plan. 108
C. Different Linguistic and Cultural Backgrounds Pose Challenges to
Local Governments in Providing Public Services
Municipalities with large numbers of Nikkeijin are faced with the
challenge of incorporating them into local society. Despite the influx of
11 Hanami, supra note 77, at 226. A few cities provide assistance for foreigners' unpaid medical
expenses. Katherine Tegtmeyer Pak, Foreigners are Local Citizens Too: Local Governments Respond to
International Migration in Japan, in JAPAN AND GLOBAL MIGRATION, supra note 14, at 244, 254. For
example, in Kawaguchi, the prefecture and city may reimburse the expense equally. Id. Kawasaki has a
similar program in cooperation with the prefecture. Id. at 257.
l° See Medical Dictionary for Brazilians Published, DAILY YOMIJRI, Dec. 3, 2001, at 10, LEXIS,
Japan Country Files.
103 Brazilian Doctor Offers Phone-Line Counseling, MANICHI DAILY NEWS, May 10, 2000, at 9,
LEXIS, Japan Country Files.
104 Hanami, supra note 77, at 225-26.
Jos Id.
16 Id. at 226.
107 id.
's Miyakawa & Ishida, supra note 64.
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Nikkeijin and continued illegal migration by other foreigners into Japan over
the last decade, most local governments are usually reluctant or incomplete
in addressing the settlement of foreigners within their jurisdiction. 1' 9 This is
partly because oldcomer groups of Korean or Chinese permanent residents
desire more self-sufficient, exclusively Korean or Chinese communities, and
partly because local governments have been inconsistent in response to
future forms of urban communities." As long as the foreigners' stay in
Japan is temporary, local governments make a good effort to provide a better
life for them; but once foreigners settle on a long-term basis and try to
establish their own self-sufficient communities, local governments usually
isolate them and refuse to face the reality of an increasingly multi-ethnic
community.1 1 However, some progressive local governments have taken
positive steps to institutionally incorporate Nikkeijin and, by extension, other
newcomers. While Nikkeijin are different from other foreign workers in that
their legal status makes them the only group of foreigners officially
authorized to take employment in any job, the two groups often share
common problems such as discrimination, helplessness, and isolation."I2 As
such, all newcomers, 'at least to some degree, experience the same
difficulties of integrating into Japanese society as those experienced by
Nikkeijin. Consequently, several local governments have adopted a wide
range of policies providing language services in public facilities, job
information services, public housing, and other services.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROCEDURAL ACCOMMODATION OF RETURNEES
AND OTHER LEGAL RESIDENTS IN JAPAN
A. Municipal Government Responses
1. Local Accommodation Policies and Programs
Since cultural differences between Japanese and foreign residents are
most apparent in the communities where they live and interact daily, some
local governments are addressing the issue by implementing "local
accommodation policies and programs" 11 3-policies and services that
109 Machimura, supra note 14, at 191.
110 Id.
Id.
112 Id. at 188-91.
113 The terminology for international migration-related policies of Japanese local governments varies
widely from city to city. For example, in Kawasaki the international migration-related policy is called
gaikokujin jfmin seisaku (foreign local citizens policy), in Hamamatsu it is kokusaika shisaku
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accommodate foreign residents' ethnic differences to facilitate their
administrative and procedural integration into Japanese society. Local
bureaucrats come into direct contact with foreigners by virtue of their duty
to enforce the Alien Registration Law, which requires local governments to
collect information about every legal foreign resident living in their
community for over three months. 1 4  As the number of legal foreign
residents dramatically increased in the last two decades, local policymakers
have concluded that, in the absence of any national policy for mediating
relations between foreigners and Japanese, a new policy was needed at the
city level. 115 Drawing from the problems of immigration experienced by
European cities-such as conflicts between immigrants and citizens over
access to jobs, housing, education, and public welfare-local Japanese
policymakers wanted to prevent immigration-related social conflict. As
discussed in the previous section, some issues such as education and health
care are directly affecting municipal governments. 117  As a result,
immigration-related issues are being addressed on the local policymaking
agenda through local accommodation policies and programs. Four cities in
particular-Kawaguchi, Shinjuku, Kawasaki, and Hamamatsu-are actively
working to provide social services to foreign residents and address the
reality of an ethnically diverse community." 8
a. Extent of initiatives undertaken by municipalities
The scope of local accommodation policies and programs can be
measured by several aspects. One aspect is the extent of initiatives
undertaken by a given city-that is, "how accessible they are to foreign
residents and to what extent the actual needs of the foreign residents are
taken into consideration. '1 19  This usually involves the breadth of
(internationalization policy measures), in Kawaguchi it is zaijfi gaikokujin in taisuru shisaku (policy
measures related to resident foreigners), and in Shinjuku it is kokusaika/kokusai kdryri jigyo
(internationalization and international exchange activities). Pak, supra note 101, at 250. This Comment
will refer to all of these terms as "local accommodation policies and/or programs," because their function is
to accommodate foreign residents' ethnic differences. (It should also be noted that "ethnic," as used in this
Comment, encompasses racial, linguistic, cultural, and religious elements.) Furthermore, these local
accommodation policies are targeted only at documented migrants. Id.
114 Pak, supra note 101, at 248. The data that is collected includes "visa status, nationality, age,
occupation, address, household composition, photographs and fingerprints." Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 247-49.
117 See discussion supra Part IV.B; Sellek, supra note 1, at 196.
118 Pak, supra note 101, 244-70. While the promulgation of local accommodation policies and
programs is not limited to these four cities, they are the most sophisticated because of the high
concentration of foreigners in these four municipalities. Id
g See id. at 253.
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information disseminated to foreign residents about available public
resources. Foreign language publications in Chinese, English, German,
Korean, Portuguese, Spanish, and Tagalog provide useful information about
living in Japan and obtaining access to social services. 120  In addition,
because foreigners are handicapped by a language barrier that prevents them
from getting to know their Japanese neighbors or from obtaining necessary
public information, local accommodation programs offer Japanese language
classes.' 21  These classes also tend to function as social clubs where
Nikkeijin can discuss their problems. 122  In addition to Japanese language
classes and tutorials for foreign children, teachers at local schools use a
Portuguese-language conversation textbook compiled by a municipal
education committee.1
23
Local accommodation programs also provide consultation services (as
another way to overcome the language barrier) either in person or over the
telephone. In Hamamatsu, 124 for example, a medium-size city home to large
automobile manufacturers such as Yamaha Corporation and Suzuki Motor
Corporation, as well as hundreds of their subcontractors, the influx of
Nikkeijin has forced the municipal government to address issues not faced by
other municipalities. 125  The Hamamatsu Foundation for International
Communications and Exchange educates Nikkeijin and other foreigners
about local rules and regulations, and offers a telephone interpretation
service.
12 6
.. id at 252, 254-57. Examples of foreign language publications include: guides on daily life in the
community, pamphlets on proper garbage disposal, evacuation procedures and charts in case of natural
disaster, health handbooks for mothers, newsletters on family welfare, materials on school life in Japan,
information on how to find rental housing, handbooks on simple conversation in Japanese, and more. Id.
121 Id. at 252. The City of Kawaguchi's Adult Education Department sponsors two two-hour evening
classes that meet weekly and offers supplemental Japanese language classes for foreign children in
elementary and junior high school two times a week after school. Id. at 254. Similarly, Shinjuku's
International Exchange Association provides Japanese language classes for adults, and its Board of
Education provides special supplementary Japanese language classes and tutoring at three elementary and
junior high schools. Id. at 255. In Kawasaki, the Kawasaki International Exchange Association even
sponsors an annual Japanese language speech contest for foreigners. Id. at 256. And in Hamamatsu, the
city's International Exchange Center offers three levels of instruction both in the mornings and evenings
and also offers instruction to foreign children in their native languages. Id. at 258.122 Wada, supra note 56.
123 Id. In Hamamatsu, for example, there were about 350 Nikkeijin children attending local schools as
of 1994. Id.
124 In 1988, only thirty Nikkeijin were living in Hamamatsu. Id. After the 1990 amendments to the
Immigration Control Act, the population of Nikkeijin rose to 4,384. Id. Hamamatsu is known to have the
largest number of Brazilian residents--11,821 as of the end of April 2001. Miyakawa & Ishida, supra note
64.
125 Wada, supra note 56.
126 Id. The foundation published a 120-page Japan survival guide in Portuguese in response to
complaints from local residents that foreigners did not comply with traffic rules and did not dump garbage
in designated places. Id. Other publications followed, such as a leaflet in English, Spanish, and Portuguese
JUNE 2002
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
b. Effort devoted to fostering a sense of community
A second aspect of the scope of local accommodation policies and
programs is the amount of effort devoted to fostering a sense of community
in the face of changing demographics. 127 Cities have engaged in cultural
exchange activities and efforts to develop accommodation policies and
programs that expand across departmental jurisdictions. 128  For example,
several cities host festivals and parties for foreigners and Japanese, as well
as lectures for Japanese residents to promote cross-cultural understanding.
29
Kawasaki facilitates communication between public offices through, among
other initiatives, participation in the Kanagawa Prefecture Consultative
Council on the Resident Foreigners Problem, which includes the prefectural
police, Yokohama Immigration Bureau office, prefectural Labor Division,
prefectural Employment Security Policy Station, and Yokohama City
officials.'
30
c. Treatment offoreign residents as "local citizens"
A final aspect of the scope of local accommodation policies and
programs is the extent to which a given city recognizes foreign residents as
"local citizens"-that is, "whether or not it seeks to ascertain their needs and
to actively involve them in the community."' 131 For example, Hamamatsu
and Kawasaki committed resources to conduct extensive surveys of the
needs of their foreign residents. 132 The Kawasaki municipal government is
the front-runner in actively involving foreign residents in community
politics. In 1996, Kawasaki also established the "Kawasaki Foreign
Residents Assembly" to incorporate foreign residents' opinions in local
policies. 133 Compared to other cities' foreign assemblies, which all operate
on how to dispose of garbage, pamphlets on fire prevention and earthquake preparation, and an English-
language city map. Id.
Pak, supra note 101, at 253.
128 m
129 Ishida, supra note 100; Pak, supra note 101, at 254-259.
30 Pak, supra note 101, at 257.
131 See id. at 253.
132 Id. at 253. Kawasaki commissioned two surveys in 1992-93 and 1994-95 to determine the needs
of resident foreigners and newcomers in the areas of medical care, working conditions, education, etc. Id.
at 257. Hamamatsu commissioned similar surveys in 1992 and 1995 focusing on education and attitudes of
Japanese employers and residents towards foreign residents. Id. at 258.
133 See Miyakawa & Ishida, supra note 64. The assembly consists of twenty-six people representing
nineteen countries serving up to two-year terms. Ishida, supra note 100. Members must be at least
eighteen years of age, registered under the Alien Registration Law, and have lived in the city continuously
VOL. 11 No. 3
LEGAL MULTICULTURALISM IN JAPAN?
as part of guideline proposals, the Kawasaki assembly wields more legal
authority because it is the first of its kind that was established based on a
local ordinance. 134  Since the mid-1990s, other local governments have
established similar assemblies and advisory bodies in an effort to promote
complete integration of foreign residents into Japanese society.135 Also in
1996, Kawasaki passed the "Kawasaki Basic Housing Regulation," which
was enacted in April 2000 and is hailed as a major step towards eliminating
housing discrimination by apartment owners against foreign, elderly, and
disabled renters. 36  Kawasaki also established a "Friendship Hall" or
community center, which is dedicated to increasing understanding between
Korean permanent residents and Japanese, and where Koreans can promote
and teach Korean language and culture.
137
2. Collaboration Among Local Governments
With Kawasaki and Hamamatsu serving as model cities effectively
integrating their foreign residents through local accommodation policies and
programs, other local governments facing similar issues with large foreign
communities are following suit.' 38  Significantly, in May 2001, thirteen
cities throughout Japan set up the Committee for Localities with a
Concentrated Foreigner Population, a joint committee set up to resolve a
variety of common problems concerning newcomers.
139
for more than one year. Id. Under the ordinance, the assembly is required to submit a yearly report to the
mayor discussing recommendations for issues raised at regular meetings where ordinary foreign residents
are encouraged to participate. Miyakawa & Ishida, supra note 64. Municipal policymakers then discuss
the feasibility of implementing the recommendations into local policies, a number of which have been
implemented by the Kawasaki government. Ishida, supra note 100.
134 Miyakawa & Ishida, supra note 64. For example, in their 1997 and 2001 annual reports submitted
to the Justice Ministry, the Kawasaki Foreign Residents Assembly included proposals for reforms of
administrative immigration laws, which were given serious consideration. Id.
135 Ishida, supra note 100. This includes Osaka, Kyoto, Shizuoka, and Mitaka (western Tokyo). Id.
136 See id. Since it is often difficult for foreigners seeking to rent an apartment to find a guarantor, the
ordinance includes an agreement between the city and insurance companies. Id. Under the agreement, the
potential foreign tenant can secure a two-year indemnity contract from insurance companies at a cost of
thirty-five percent of the total cost of one month's rent and maintenance fees, in place of a guarantor. Id.
The insurance companies guarantee up to seven months' rent and maintenance fees, in addition to three
months' rent for restoration costs if the tenant moves out without paying rent. Id.
137 Pak, supra note 101, at 259.
138 Wada, supra note 56.
139 See Miyakawa & Ishida, supra note 64. The committee was established under a proposal from the
government of Hamamatsu. Id. The Director of Hamamatsu's International Affairs Office, Hisao Yasui,
commented on the upcoming meeting of mayors of thirteen municipalities (Hamamatsu International
Symposium):
Local communities and governments have been making various attempts to deal with an increasing
number of newcomers. But problems are difficult for a single municipality to settle. So we proposed
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B. Local Organizations Designed to Facilitate. Multiculturalism
In addition to the formal forms of accommodation for foreigners
administered by municipal governments, ethnic difference is also
accommodated by local organizations designed to facilitate the increasing
ethnic diversity in communities. Former members of the Kawasaki Foreign
Residents' Assembly started a volunteer group, the Kawasaki Foreign
Citizens' Volunteers, which promotes multiculturalism through folk dances,
performing arts, and ethnic recipes. 14° In Tokyo, relief efforts to help
foreign victims of the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995 led to the founding
of the Tokyo Ethnic Multilingual-Multicultural Center, which is under an
umbrella group called the Ethnic Media Press Center ("EMPC").14  Other
organizations take on an advocacy function. United for a Multicultural
Japan ("UMJ"), an advocacy group founded in 1996 for spouses of Japanese
nationals, is known for battling the Justice Ministry and immigration bureaus
over foreigners' rights. 142 The leader of the Rights of Immigrants Network,
a volunteer group based in Osaka, declared that the Japanese government
should create an independent multicultural organization to protect human
rights of foreign residents in Japan. 43  The Asian People's Friendship
Society supports foreign residents in Tokyo's Itabashi Ward. 44 All of these
are in addition to city-sponsored groups such as the Kawaguchi International
Exchange Comer, the Shinjuku International Exchange Center, the
joining hands with other regional governments facing similar problems to exchange information so as
to come up with better solutions. We are planning to call for coexistence (between Japanese and non-
Japanese residents) in local communities and to make proposals on such issues as education, social
security and administrative procedures.
140 Ishida, supra note 100.
141 Koichi Oi, Windows on the World Popping Up for Information-Starved Foreigners, MAINICHI
DAILY NEWS, June 26, 1996, at 9, LEXIS, Japan Country Files. The EMPC emphasizes cultural interaction
by matching Chinese, Korean, Tagalog, Portuguese, and Thai speaking residents with Japanese interested
in learning those languages, in exchange for Japanese language instruction. lId
142 Tom Westin, Standing Up for the Rights of Others, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 5, 2001, at 7, LEXIS,
Japan Country Files. The UMJ lobbies for "custody rights for foreign parents divorced from Japanese
spouses, a repeal of the reentry permit system, and the extension of [voting rights) for permanent
residents." Id. The UMJ receives up to 600 calls a week, mostly from permanent residents, with inquiries
ranging from salary issues, work-related injuries, tax problems, divorces and marriages. lIt The eight-
member staff offers referrals, provides legal advice, and litigates the more serious cases in court. Id.
Membership in the UMJ has reached 800 as of 2001. Id.
143 Lawyer Urges Protection of Foreigners, JAPAN TIMES, June 6, 1999, LEXIS, Japan Country Files.
'4 Hiroshi Munakata, Tokyo District Is Home Away from Home; Asian Immigrants Flock to Area in
Shinjuku; Longtime Resident Views Influx with Mixed Feelings, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Sept. 30, 1996, at 18,
LEXIS, Japan Country Files. For example, the group has an international marriage hotline through which it
receives hundreds of inquiries. Id.
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Kawasaki International Exchange Association, the Committee for the
Promotion of Foreign Local Citizens' Policy, the Liaison Consultative
Council on Kawasaki's Foreign Local Citizens' Policy, and the Hamamatsu
International Exchange Center. 145
There are even several foreign language newspapers published weekly
throughout Japan, as well as radio and television stations that broadcast
news and entertainment in different languages. Ethnic media in Japan, with
the exception of the Korean media, is a rather new phenomenon dating back
no farther than the late 1980s. 146 Over 100 publications, with circulations
ranging from under 1,000 to over 50,000, cater to "newcomers" from Asia
and Latin America in search of employment. 147 In the last several years, the
content and medium of Japan's ethnic media has been changing, primarily in
response to its audience, who feel a stronger sense of having settled down in
Japan for the long term. Print media are shifting to audio-visual modes of
communication, such as radio and television. 148 More importantly, the
content of ethnic media is changing from a former concern with providing
lifestyle information and tips on survival to new goals of broadening its
audience to Nikkeijin and encouraging contact between foreigners and
Japanese.149 Executives of many of these ethnic media companies recognize
the influential role the ethnic media plays as a cultural bridge in the face of
increasing diversity and globalization.
50
Apart from these institutionalized groups, foreign and Japanese
residents in a few cities are embracing the ethnic diversity of their
communities. In Kobe, for example, foreign residents from thirteen
countries and Japanese residents opened the Asian Flea Market in 1996 with
intentions to build a multicultural shopping and residential area called "Asia
Town."15 ' Similarly, the multiethnic community in Kabukich6 continues to
develop as a pan-Asian enclave.'
52
115 Pak, supra note 101, at 254-58.
l4 Oi, supra note 141.
147 See id. For example, several Portuguese-language newspapers published weekly are distributed
throughout Japan, and Nikkeijin from Brazil get all their latest news from these sources. Id.
48 Id. For example, a multilingual radio station, Inter-FM, made its debut in 1996 boasting eight
languages: English, Chinese, Korean, Tagalog, Indonesian, Thai, Spanish, and Portuguese. Id. In
addition, all of the station's on-air personalities are resident foreigners. Id.
149 ld. In 1996, Multilingual TV-an offspring of Perfect TV, Japan's first multi-channel digital
satellite broadcaster-set aside two channels for resident foreigners, one broadcasting in Spanish and the
other in Portuguese. Id. Multilingual TV offers 24-hour-a-day programming featuring social issues of
interest to the resident foreigner, combined with news and drama broadcasts from Brazil, Peru and other
Latin American countries. Id. Media like Inter-FM, Multilingual TV, and others quench foreigners' thirst
for information frustrated by the language barrier. Id.
150 Id.
151 Kahori Sakane, Kobe's Asian Community Opens Flea Market, DAILY YOMIURI, July 28, 1996, at
2, LEXIS, Japan Country Files. The impetus for creating the Asian Flea Market came as a result of the
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In sum, the difficulties of integrating into Japanese society are not
faced by Nikkeijin alone, but are shared by other foreign residents
(newcomers) as well. As the number of foreign residents continue to
increase, problems associated with immigration will only become more
widespread. The problem is exacerbated if illegal migrants are included, of
which there are many and whose presence in Japan is not likely to diminish.
However, despite these problems, the central government has yet to develop
a national policy for addressing immigration related issues. Immigration
policies remain restrictive, and the central government continues to be
unresponsive to local efforts for greater minority rights. The local
governments' treatment of Nikkeijin and newcomers-namely, to
accommodate their ethnic difference both administratively and socially-can
be contrasted with how the central government has responded to the reality
of ethnic minority groups in Japan.
VI. How ETHNIC DIFFERENCE IS ACCOMMODATED IN THE JAPANESE LEGAL
SYSTEM
Although constitutional provisions exist that confer equal treatment
and respect for individual rights to all persons in Japan, these guarantees
exist in the abstract-in the reality of legal and administrative practice, they
have provided far fewer protections for individual rights, particularly for
ethnic minorities. The scope of constitutional rights has been circumscribed
by a conservative central government and a judiciary deferential to executive
and legislative branches of government. This was certainly the case for
almost forty years after the inception of Japan's Constitution. It was not
until the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Japan ratified various
international human rights treaties, that the situation improved somewhat.
Still, progressive legal change has been incremental due to the institutional
inertia of nearly uninterrupted rule by the conservative Liberal Democratic
Party ("LDP"). Despite recent events that appear to indicate positive steps
toward recognition of the rights of ethnic minorities-such as the Ainu
rights case and proposed legislation that would give voting rights to Korean
permanent residents-the Japanese government continues to take a cautious
and reluctant approach to lawmaking that recognizes ethnic difference.
Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995, when over 5,000 Koreans and about 500 Vietnamese began to form
relationships with Japanese residents as they helped each other rebuild their lives and businesses. Id.
152 Sei Sasaki, Tokyo Enclave Is Home Away from Home: Kabukich45 Offers Migrants Opportunity,
Sense of Familiarity, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Sept. 15, 1997, at 1, LEXIS, Japan Country Files.
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A. Constitutional Guarantees are Not Universal
The present-day human rights provisions that were ultimately adopted
with the inception of the post-war Japanese Constitution 153 reflect a
compromise between the efforts of the Supreme Command of the Allied
Powers in the Pacific ("SCAP") 154 to expand rights, and the constant
opposition from the Japanese government to limit the expansion. 155 The
final Constitution is a diluted version of the original SCAP draft provisions,
which explicitly extended protection of rights to aliens, women, and
illegitimate children. Whether the Constitution afforded any protection at all
for these groups was an issue that resulted in decades of litigation.1 56
The Japanese Constitution contains several declarations of human
rights. For example, Article 13 reads:
All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent
that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme
consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs157
Similarly, Article 14 proclaims: "All of the people are equal under the law
and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations
because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin."'158  Other
guarantees include: Article 24, which provides for equal rights for husbands
and wives; 159 Article 25, which secures the right to a decent life; 16° and
finally, Article 26, which guarantees the right to equal education. 16'
153 After Japan's defeat in the Second World War, the Meiji Constitution of 1868 was amended under
the auspices of the Allied Forces. See generally, THEODORE MCNELLY, THF ORIGINS OF JAPAN'S
DEMOCRATIC CONSTrrtrON (2000). The Meiji Constitution, written by Meiji oligarchs who disfavored
popular rule and wielded tight control over the country through a centralized system of governance,
prioritized the interests of the state (as embodied by the Emperor) over the interests of the individual.
Sylvia Brown Hamano, Incomplete Revolutions and Not So Alien Transplants: The Japanese Constitution
and Human Rights, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 415,423-24 (1999).
154 General Douglas MacArthur headed the SCAP, which was the administrative organ in charge of
implementing the Potsdam Declaration in Japan. See generally, MCNELLY, supra note 153.
155 Hamano, supra note 153, at 431. The constitution-making process included several Japanese
government officials. Id at 426. In addition, numerous non-governmental groups and private individuals
produced draft constitutions or proposals, which were dismissed by the conservatives in power. Id. at 426-
27.
156 Id. at 438.
157 See NIHONKOKU KENPO [Constitution] (1946) art. 13 (Japan).
151 See id. art. 14.
"' See id2 art. 24.
160 See id. art. 25.
161 See id. art. 26.
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However, Japanese constitutional guarantees of human rights-as
drafted by the SCAP-were narrowed in three areas by the Japanese
government during the drafting process. First, draft provisions guaranteeing
individual rights were limited by the introduction of the "public welfare"
condition, which the Japanese Supreme Court has subsequently interpreted
as meaning that all other rights guaranteed under the Constitution must be
"subject to the limits for public welfare included in Articles 12 and 13 of the
Constitution." 162 In other words, when the rights of the individual are pitted
against the interest of the public, the public interest prevails.
Second, the Japanese government retracted protections given to aliens,
which later had a significantly detrimental impact on ethnic Korean and• • • 163
Taiwanese residents in Japan. In the course of negotiations between the
SCAP and the Japanese government over the draft provisions, the Japanese
government prevailed in implementing a seemingly minor change in the
language of Article 1 3 .164 Specifically, "all natural persons" in the SCAP's
draft was replaced with "all of the people" or kokumin in Japanese, which
literally means "people of the nation" or citizens.1 65 In contrast, where the
constitution refers to "every person," "no person," and "all persons," the
word nanbito, which literally means "every person," is used. Hence, all
persons do not always constitute all of the people.167  Thus, embedded in
constitutional provisions referencing kokumin is a notion of citizenship not
apparent in the English translation. When the Allied Occupation of Japan
ended in 1952, the Japanese government retracted Japanese citizenship of its
162 Georgina Stevens, The Ainu and Human Rights: Domestic and International Legal Protections,
2(2) JAPANESE STUDIES 181, 189 (2001). Article 12 reads: "The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the
people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavour of the people, who shall refrain
from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the
public welfare." (Emphasis added.) See NIHONKOKU KENPO [Constitution] (1946) art. 12 (Japan).
Similarly, Article 13 protects individual rights subject to the condition that "it does not interfere with the
public welfare." See id. art.13.
163 During World War II, Japan forced many Koreans and Taiwanese, whose countries were
colonized by Japan at the time, to come to Japan to work as laborers. See Sonia Ryang, Resident Koreans
in Japan, in KOREANS IN JAPAN: CRITICAL VoIcEs FROM ME MARGIN 1, 1-4 (Sonia Ryang ed., 2000);
Kumi Matsumaru, Floating Between Cultures, Daily Yomirui, Jan. 11, 2002, at 7, LEXIS, Japan Country
Files. Most came from the Korean peninsula, totaling over two million. See Ryang, at 3. As colonial
subjects, they had the status of Japanese citizens. Id. at 4.
164 Hamano, supra note 153, at 435-437. In drafting the Constitution, a key issue was whom the
Constitution would protect. Id. at 435.
165 Id. at 437; Mark A. Levin, Essential Commodities and Racial Justice: Using Constitutional
Protection of Japan's Indigenous Ainu People to Inform Understandings of the United States and Japan,
33(2) N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 419,482 (2001).166 Levin, supra note 165, at 482.
167 Id.
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former colonial subjects. 168 Consequently, Korean and Taiwanese residents
in Japan became resident aliens. 1
69
Finally, the drafting process failed to extend full protection to the
rights of women and illegitimate children. Again, the article proposed by
SCAP that would have extended protection to mothers and children bom out
of wedlock was not included in the final Constitution.'
70
Thus, since the inception of the Constitution, the Japanese
government sought to limit legal protections for non-Japanese and other
disfavored groups.' 71  It is no surprise that the scope of constitutionally
guaranteed rights was constrained by discriminatory domestic laws and by a
cautious judiciary that was generally restrained in judicial review.
B. Scope of Constitutional Rights Has Been Circumscribed
For almost forty years after the inception of the Constitution, the
central government determined the scope of constitutional rights. Despite
the existence of constitutional protections, in the reality of legal and
administrative practice, they have been narrowly applied. Prior to Japan's
ratification of various international human rights treaties, many domestic
laws discriminated against aliens, women, and illegitimate children. In
addition, courts have tended to give deference to the legislature and the
executive, and have generally been reluctant to strike down as
unconstitutional legislation restricting human rights.'72
6s Ryang, supra note 163, at 4.
69 This mostly affected the approximately 600,000 Koreans who chose to remain in Japan following
the war. Id It was not until 1965 that Japan and South Korea signed a bilateral treaty to award special
"permanent resident" status to Koreans who had been stripped of their Japanese citizenship. l Their
descendants are also granted the special status. Matsurnaru, supra note 163. Thus, the special "permanent
resident" status is granted to Koreans and Taiwanese residents in Japan to recognize their unique placement
in Japanese history. Id.
1 Hamano, supra note 153, at 438. The SCAP's proposed article stated:
In all spheres of life, laws shall be designed for the protection and extension of social welfare;
and of freedom, justice and democracy. . . . To this end the Diet shall enact legislation which
shall: Protect and aid expectant and nursing mothers, promote infant and child welfare, and
establish just rights for illegitimate and adopted children, and for the underprivileged.
'ld IdId 171 Id.
172 The limited role of the Japanese judiciary has been described as follows:
Japan has been in an era of constitutional government in which strong executive powers have
been justified on the grounds that such power is necessary to achieve economic success and to
catch up to the prosperity of the Western world. Strong executive power often results in
suppression of political opposition and limitations on judicial independence as law supports
economic development at the expense of civil liberties.
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While theoretically, guarantees of fundamental human rights apply to
foreigners, this protection is entirely dependent on the discretion of the
Minister of Justice, who decides whether or not an alien is permitted to live
in Japan. 17
3
Even when the conduct of aliens during their stay is in accord
with the Constitution and is lawful, if the Minister of Justice
determines that the conduct of the alien is undesirable for Japan
from the perspective of propriety, or if it is inferred from the
said conduct that there is danger in the future that the said alien
will behave in a way harmful to Japan's interests, this does not
amount to depriving the alien of constitutional protection.
174
Moreover, the Minister of Justice has broad discretion; his decision can only
be challenged by a showing that the administrative decision is manifestly
devoid of reason, basically shielding it from judicial reversal. 175  Thus, the
constitutional guarantee of fundamental human rights to aliens extends only
as far as the State permits.
C. International Human Rights Law
As a result of Japan's accession to various international human rights
treaties beginning in 1979,176 many social rights have been extended to non-
citizens. For example, previously, the Japanese government interpreted
Article 25 of the Japanese Constitution-which states that "All nationals
shall have the right to maintain the standards of wholesome and cultured
living"'177 (emphasis added)-as a guarantee of social rights only to Japanese
Percy Luney, Jr., The Judiciary: Its Organization and Status in the Parliamentary System, in JAPANESE
CONSTrTJTIONALLAW, at 123, 145.
173 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Cabinet Order No. 319 of 195 1, amended by
Law No. 135 of 1999, art 21, provisional translation (Japan), http:llwww.moj.go.jp/ENGLISHIIB/ib-
20.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Immigration Control Act]; Hamano, supra note 153, at 465,
citing McLean v. Justice Minister, translated in LAWRENCE BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONST1LrrTONAL
CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 471 (1996).
174 See Hamano, supra note 153, at 465, citing McLean v. Justice Minister.
175 Hamano, supra note 153, at 465-66.
176 Japan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1979; the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1982; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women in 1985; the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1994; and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1995. YUJI IWASAWA,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, HuMAN RIGHTS, AND JAPANESE LAW 2-3 (1998).
177 See NIRONKOKu KENPO [Constitution] (1946) art. 25 (Japan).
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nationals.178  In light of international human rights law, 179 which guarantees
social rights to "everyone," the Japanese government has acknowledged that
"everyone" includes not only nationals but also aliens. 180
International human rights law has been the impetus for a number of
important changes to Japan's domestic laws. 181 The nationality requirements
in several domestic laws were systematically eliminated, thereby extending
protection to aliens.182  These legal changes have mostly affected Korean
permanent residents. Litigants seeking relief from a violation have invoked
international human rights law in addition to Japanese constitutional
provisions. 183 Because international human rights law provides more clarity
than Japan's domestic law, courts have used it as an interpretive aid.
l8
However, in general, the courts are reluctant to find violations of
international human rights law.185  This is because Japanese courts are
unfamiliar with international human rights law, and are generally reluctant to
invalidate statutes on constitutional grounds. 186  Consequently, the courts
avoid striking down statutes as unconstitutional by invoking the "public
welfare" clauses of Articles 12 and 13 of the Constitution. l1 7 More recently,
the courts have justified restrictions of human rights by deferring to the
legislature's discretion and finding a statute unconstitutional "only when it is
obvious that the restriction contained in the statute is excessively
178 IWASAWA, supra note 176, at 167.
179 Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
provides that "[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security,
including social assistance." (Emphasis added.) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976; for Japan, Sept. 21, 1979), quoted in
IWASAWA, supra note 176, at 167.
am IWASAWA, supra note 176, at 167.
s Id. at 123. The Japanese government acknowledged that signing on to the International Covenants
on Human Rights in 1979 would require changes to domestic laws concerning the treatment of resident
aliens in Japan. Id.
112 Id. at 169-99. For example, due to conflicts with Article 9 of the ICESCR, in 1986 the Ministry of
Health and Welfare eliminated the nationality requirement from its previous Order under which aliens were
ineligible for the national health insurance scheme. Id. at 170. With Japan's accession to the Refugee
Convention in 1982, nationality restrictions were eliminated from the National Pension Law, the Child
Dependency Allowance Law, the Special Child Dependency Allowance Law, and the Child Allowance
Law. Id. at 171, 174. Other laws-such as the Public Housing Law, the Japan Housing Corporation Law,
and the Government Housing Loan Corporation Law-that did not have a nationality requirement but were
narrowly applied to exclude aliens were also changed. Id. at 175.
'83 Crane Stephen Landis, Human Rights Violations in Japan: A Contemporary Survey, 5 DETRorr
C.L. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 53, 72 (1996).
184 IWASAWA, supra note 176, at 299.
1s5 Id. at 299. This is true with respect to fingerprinting of aliens, national pensions, war
compensation to aliens, nationality of children, and treatment of illegitimate children. Id.
186 Id. at 303-04; see generally HIROSHI ITOH, THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT: CONsTrrUTIONAL
PoLIcEs (1989).
187 Hamano, supra note 153, at 462.
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unreasonable."' 88 This standard is easily satisfied, since even a minimum
level of reasonableness is enough. 189 In short, despite some improvements
to domestic law as a result of Japan's ratification of various international
human rights treaties, full recognition of constitutional human rights in
Japan remains hindered by institutional inertia.
190
D. Institutional Inertia Persists
The Japanese government has historically dealt with ethnic minorities
by subordinating them through policies of assimilation and exclusion.
Indeed, the shortcomings of the Japanese legal system are illustrated by the
experiences of two other groups of legal residents whose presence in Japan
predates that of the recent migrants: the indigenous Ainu 191 and permanent
resident Koreans. The Ainu, although Japanese nationals, are an indigenous
group considered by the Japanese government to be a historical ethnic
minority.1 92  The Korean permanent residents are Japan's largest ethnic
minority, numbering almost 700,000, whose legal status has vacillated
between citizen and non-citizen. Both groups have been seeking greater
political recognition from the Japanese government. The contentious
relationship between each of these groups and the central government
illustrates that the Japanese legal system has been ill-equipped to
accommodate ethnic difference.
188 See IWASAWA, supra note 176, at 304.
189 Id.
190 For example, the Japanese government refused to implement the recommendations of the U.N.
Human Rights Committee ("Committee") in 1998. Hamano, supra note 153, at 480-81. The Committee
strongly recommended two institutional changes: (1) an extensive training program for judges, prosecutors
and administrative officers educating them about the government's obligations under the ICCPR; and (2)
the creation of an independent authority for the investigation of human rights violations with the power to
give redress to complainants. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of
the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Human Rights Committee, 64th
Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C79/Add.102, para. 2.
191 The Ainu, an indigenous people living on Hokkaid6, the northern islands of the Japanese
archipelago, are physically, culturally, and religiously distinct from the Japanese majority. Landis, supra
note 183, at 66-67. For an anthropological and archeological analysis of two prevailing theories concerning
the origins of the Ainu and the present-day Japanese people, see Katayama Kazumichi, The Japanese as an
Asia-Pacific Population, in MULTICULTURAL JAPAN: PALEOLrrHlC To POSTMODERN (Donald Denoon et al.
eds., 1996) [hereinafter MUL'nCULTURAL JAPAN].
192 The plight of the Ainu in Japan can be compared to the Native American Indians in the United
States.
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1. The Ainu Rights Case and Subsequent Legislation
a. The Nibutani Dam Decision
The Ainu rights case, also known as the Nibutani Dam decision, is a
landmark decision by a district court recognizing the Ainu as an indigenous
people of Japan entitled to the right to exercise their ethnic and cultural
identity. 193  The decision is significant for its "application of Article 13 to
members of an ethnic minority group for the right to enjoy ethnic culture
associated with the minority group membership."
' 94
Still, however progressive the Ainu rights decision may be, its
potential weight as legal authority to future cases involving minorities
remains dubious for several reasons. First, a feature of the Japanese legal
system is its failure to halt projects while they are judicially challenged.
Therefore, government entities can continue engaging in the challenged
activity notwithstanding the fact that doing so allegedly violates domestic or
international law. 195 In addition, courts have not provided adequate redress
for grievances against the government because the judiciary has consistently
given deference to the legislative and executive branches.' 96  Second, the
court effectively narrowed its holding to indigenous peoples by suggesting
that the ethnic culture of the Ainu warrants preferential treatment over other
193 Kayano et al. v. Hokkaid6 Expropriation Committee, 1598 HANREI JIHO 33,938 HANREI TIMEs 75
(Sapporo Dist. Ct., Mar. 27, 1997) (Japan), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 394 (Mark A. Levin trans., 1999),
http://www.Hawaii.edu/law/facpubs/nibutani.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Nibutani Dam
Decision]. The court held it was illegal for the Japanese government to expropriate Ainu land, particularly
religious, cultural, and archeological sites belonging to the Ainu. Id.
19 See Levin, supra note 165, at 487. The authority supporting the court's decision was founded on a
broad interpretation of Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution and on Article 27 of the ICCPR. Id. The
court found that Article 27 imposes "an obligation [sic] upon all contracting nations to exercise due care..
when deciding upon, or executing, national policies which have the risk of adversely affecting a
minority's culture." Stevens, supra note 162, at 190.
19, Stevens, supra note 162, at 193. In the Nibutani Dam case, at the end of the two years of
litigation, the court rendered its decision that erecting the dam was illegal, but by then the dam was nearly
complete. Id. Three of the Ainu cultural sites were already destroyed, and halting or removing the dam
structure would have entailed huge monetary costs to the public. Id.
196 Under the former Meiji Constitution, judicial review of governmental actions was not widely
practiced. Id. When the Japanese Constitution was amended in 1946, it vested the power of judicial review
to the Supreme Court, which can delegate its power to the inferior courts. Id. The change was merely one
of organization, since it moved the function of judicial review from the Ministry of Justice to the
independent venue of the Supreme Court. IM No significant change occurred in the composition of the
judiciary, which was disproportionately represented by the postwar generation who had "dubious records
during the war or opposition to the new Constitution." Hamano, supra note 153, at 443. Deference to the
legislative and executive branches began to wane by the late 1960s, when "Japanese judges, including
Justices on the Supreme Court, began to rule occasionally against the government." Id. at 446.
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minorities living in Japan. 197  Third, since the Nibutani Dam decision was
made by a lower court, its precedential impact is uncertain. 198 Finally, it is
an isolated decision by one lower court that does not necessarily signify a
parallel shift in philosophy within Japanese government.
b. The Ainu Culture Law
Contrary to the Sapporo District Court's progressive approach in the
Ainu rights case, the central government offered a cautious and reluctant
response through enactment of the 1997 Act for Promotion of Ainu Culture
and Dissemination of Knowledge Regarding Ainu Traditions 1" ("Ainu
Culture Law"). The Ainu Culture Law repealed the 1899 Hokkaid6 Former
Aboriginals Protection Act,2°° which was a relic of the Meiji era that
epitomized the assimilation policies of that period and which defined the
relationship between the Ainu and the Japanese government for nearly a
century. 20' Although the Ainu Culture Law has been identified as being "the
197 Stevens, supra note 162, at 192. One commentator has suggested that the Sapporo District
Court's interpretation of Article 27 seems to go beyond current international interpretations, such as that
made by the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC). Id. That is, rather than suggesting that
indigenous groups have more protection or greater rights under Article 27 than minorities (as the Nibutani
court suggests), the UNHRC's interpretation simply recognizes the unique ways in which indigenous
culture is expressed. Id.
198 Because Japan follows a code (civil) law system, the primary basis for judicial decisions is
grounded in code provisions. Stevens, supra note 162, at 188. While Supreme Court decisions are
followed by lower courts as authoritative, even binding interpretations of statutes, they are not regarded as
a source of law. Id.
199 See Act for the Promotion of Ainu Culture & Dissemination of Knowledge Regarding Ainu
Tradition, No. 52, 1997 (Japan), translated in 1 AsIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 11 (Masako Yoshida
Hitchingham trans., 2000), available at http://www.hawaii.edulaplpj/pdfsll -masako.pdf (last visited Mar.
29, 2002).
200 See Hokkaid6 Former Aboriginals Protection Act, No. 27, 1899 (Japan), reprinted in RICHARD
SIDDLE, RACE, RESISTANCE AND THE AINU OF JAPAN (1996), app. 1 at 194 (English translation).
201 Viewed as "foreign," the Ainu have had a contentious relationship with the Japanese majority.
See generally, Richard Siddle, Ainu: Japan's Indigenous People, in JAPAN'S MINORmIES: THE ILLUSION
OF HOMOGENErY, supra note 1, at 17. The beginning of this relationship can be traced back to the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, during which a Japan-centric view of the world order by the Japanese
was perpetuated by differentiating Ainu and other "foreigners" from "true Japanese." Tessa Morris-Suzuki,
A Descent Into the Past: The Frontier in the Construction of Japanese Identity, in MULTICULTURAL JAPAN,
supra note 191, at 81, 84. This conscious effort to differentiate the Ainu from the Japanese was then
reversed during the eighteenth century by implementing a policy of "Japanisation" as a means of asserting
Japanese control over the Ainu. Id. at 85. This policy was carried out by requiring Ainu to change their
appearance to that of Japanese farmers by shaving their beards, cutting their hair, wearing straw sandals
and raincoats, eating rice, and learning the Japanese language. Id. During the Meiji period (1868-1910),
assimilationist laws and regulations went beyond appearance, language, and diet to extend to the entire
material structures of everyday life, eventually culminating into the passage of the Hokkaid6 Former
Aboriginals Protection Act ("Protection Act") in 1899. Levin, supra note 165, at 436 n.62. "Although
framed in welfare terms, Protection Act agriculturalization policies actively imposed unstated policies of
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first in Japanese history to recognize the presence of a minority in Japan and
to create national duties to act on its behalf,"2°2 the law as passed was
stripped of much of its protective aspects from the original draft legislation
as proposed by the Ainu people.20 Significantly, provisions addressing
"self-determination, special representation, access to natural resources,
economic autonomy, and anti-discrimination" 2°4 were rejected in the final
Ainu Culture Law, thereby relegating the law to provisions for cultural
promotion about the Ainu. Thus, the historical treatment of the Ainu by the
Meiji government-to exclude the Ainu from the class of majority Japanese
by distinguishing differences in appearance, manner, and custom--persists
to some extent through a law that, while recognizing ethnic difference, does
not confer enforceable substantive rights.
2. Japanese Lawmakers Adhere to a Conservative Stance in Regard to
Voting Rights for Permanent Residents
Another example of the Japanese government's conservative approach
to dealing with minority groups' demands for greater rights is the issue of
voting rights for permanent residents. Following a 1995 Japanese Supreme
Court decision announcing, in dicta, that the Japanese legislature could draft
law allowing foreign residents in Japan the right to vote in local elections,
20 5
206the issue of noncitizen voting rights has been on the national agenda. The
lobbying efforts for voting rights in local and national elections has been led
segregation, forced assimilation, economic dislocation, and social subordination." Id. at 437 n.65 (citing
SIDDLE, supra note 200).
202 See Levin, supra note 165, at 467.
203 Hanazaki Kthei, Ainu Moshir and Yaponesia: Ainu and Okinawan Identities in Contemporary
Japan, in MULTICULTURAL JAPAN, supra note 191, at 117, 126.
2 See Levin, supra note 165, at 467.
205 In the Kim Local Suffrage Case, Korean permanent residents were prohibited from being listed on
voter regulation rolls and were denied the opportunity to participate in local elections. Atsushi Kondo, The
Constitutional Rights of Non-Citizens: Electoral Rights for "Non-Citizens," at http://www.eur.nl/frg/
iacl/papers/kondo.htnl (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs argument
that long-term foreign residents are included in the word "residents" (jyumin) in Article 93(2) of the
Japanese Constitution, which states that "[t]he chief executive officers of all local public entities, the
members of their assemblies, and such other local officials as may be determined by law shall be elected by
direct residents' vote within their several communities." Id. (emphasis added.). Instead, the Court held
that only Japanese citizens have a constitutional right to vote in such elections, reasoning that the word
"people" (kokumin) in Article 15 refers to Japanese nationals. Id. Article 15 states, "The people have the
inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them." See NIHONKOKU KENPO
[Constitution] (1946) art. 15 (Japan).
m Christopher B. Johnstone, Japan's Foreign Residents and the Quest for Expanded Political Rights,
Japan Economic Institute (JEI) Report, July 19, 1996, Report A, at http:llwww.gwjapan.comlftplpubl
policy/jei/1996/a-series/0719-96a.txt (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
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primarily by the ethnic Korean permanent residents living in Japan.207  In
July 2000, a bill was drafted to grant foreigners with permanent residency
status the right to vote in local elections.2 °8 Many Japanese politicians and
some commentators welcomed the proposed legislation, arguing that
permanent residents, because of their unique history and special residency
status in Japan, should be given the right to vote in both local and national
elections.
209
Despite arguments from supporters of the voting rights bill, the
politics of Japanese lawmaking indicate that suffrage for permanent
residents is not imminent. For example, politicians did not request input
from the Korean permanent residents throughout the yearlong debate on the
issue. 2 1  More significantly, opponents within the dominant, conservative
Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP"), who want to limit voting rights to
Japanese nationals, argued that the legislation might be unconstitutional, and
that granting suffrage would discourage permanent residents from
naturalizing as Japanese citizens. 211  Consequently, the bill has been
212
shelved. These members of the LDP favor dissolving the voting rights
bill in favor of passing a related bill, one that would streamline the
naturalization process for Korean permanent residents.2 13 The logic behind
this view is that once Korean permanent residents naturalize as Japanese
citizens, they will subsequently have the right to vote in local and national
elections. However, passage of the naturalization bill would have a
207 Moves To Give Voting Rights To Permanent Foreign Residents, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Jan. 11, 2002,
LEXIS, Japan Country Files.
208 See id The bill was introduced by the New Komeito and Hoshuto (New Conservative Party). Id.
209 Shigenori Matsui, Aliens Under the Japanese Constitution, in FOREIGN WORKERS PROBLEMS:
JAPAN AND THE U.S. 85, 93, 101 (Shigenori Matsui & Susumu Noda eds., 1993).
210 Moves to Give Voting Rights to Permanent Foreign Residents, supra note 207.
211 Id.; LDP Lawmakers Oppose Voting Right for Foreigners, JAPAN ECON. NEwSW1RE, May 15,
2001, LEXIS, Japan Country Files.
212 Moves to Give Voting Rights to Permanent Foreign Residents, supra note 207.
213 Currently, naturalization in Japan can be characterized as opaque and arbitrary. PAPADEMETRIOU
& HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 45. Similar to the United States, Japan requires that the applicant has
resided in Japan continuously for a period of at least five years, be of "upright conduct," and never have
plotted against the overthrow of the Japanese Constitution or government. See Nationality Law, No. 147,
1950, amended by Law No. 268, 1952 and Law No. 45, 1984, art. 5 (Japan) [hereinafter Nationality Law].
Additional factors, however, include ambiguous and subjective criteria such as whether an applicant's
lifestyle is suited to Japanese society. Japanese Editorial Excerpts, Discuss Suffrage in Proper Context,
DAILY YOMIuRI, Jan. 19, 2001, LEXIS, Japan Country Files. Finally, the Justice Minister has the broad
discretion to grant or deny naturalization to applicants. See Nationality Law, arts. 4-10. Not surprisingly,
naturalization in Japan occurs on a lesser scale than in countries with more streamlined naturalization
procedures like the United States or Canada. Moves to Give Voting Rights to Permanent Foreign
Residents, supra note 207. The naturalization bill would make it easier for foreigners with special
permanent residency status to become Japanese citizens simply by notifying the authorities. Id.
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comparatively muted effect than the voting rights legislation because most
Koreans do not wish to naturalize.
214
E. Central Government Policies Reinforce Assumptions of Ethnic
Homogeneity
As the experiences of the Ainu and Korean permanent residents
indicate, the Japanese legal system operates incrementally and selectively
when it comes to recognizing ethnic difference. In the Ainu rights case, the
court's ruling emphasized the indigenous characteristic of the Ainu as an
ethnic group, thereby leaving little room for application of its holding to
other ethnic minorities, such as Korean and Chinese permanent residents.
With the voting rights issue, the government's preference for streamlining
the naturalization process over granting voting rights to permanent residents
may indicate that the central government is not yet ready to accept a notion
of community membership that is not necessarily defined by citizenship
status, contrary to the local governments' treatment of foreign residents as
"local citizens." At the same time, the central government has recognized
that Korean and Taiwanese residents, because of their unique place in
Japanese history, should be given more favorable treatment under a special
"permanent resident" status than other aliens. Similarly, the Japanese
government's decision to create a new category for Nikkeijin, while
excluding all other foreign migrants, illustrates the central government's
assumption of ethnic homogeneity. Japanese lineage, however remote,
serves as the determining factor for Japanese nationality.
In short, the central government carves out portions of its population
according to ethnicity and confers different packages of rights accordingly.
South American Nikkeijin may, in theory, be in a better position relative to
other ethnic minorities because they can assert their Japanese ancestry as a
reason for greater ethnic accommodation. However, the government's
reliance on Japanese ancestry to justify immigration of South American
Nikkeijin who are far-removed from Japanese language and culture, does not
seem to make sense when viewed against the government's reluctance to
214 According to a survey conducted by the pro-Seoul Korean Residents Union in Japan (Mindan),
one in four Koreans living in Japan hopes to become a Japanese citizen. One in Four Korean Residents in
Japan Wants Japanese Citizenship, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 24, 2001, LEXIS, Japan Country Files.
Compared to first-generation Koreans, more younger generation Koreans seek naturalization, since they
have been born and raised in Japan. Id. Fifty percent of the respondents oppose naturalization, arguing that
relinquishing Korean citizenship is tantamount to forsaking one's Korean identity. Id.; Nationality Bill
Divides Koreans in Japan, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 3, 2001, LEXIS, Japan Country Files.
215 Sellek, supra note 1, at 202.
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grant voting rights to Korean permanent residents, most of whom have been
born and raised in Japan. This highlights the relatively conservative
ethnocentric stance of the central government-one that stubbornly adheres
to a concept of community based strictly on a contrived notion of "Japanese
blood," even if lacking in Japanese language and culture.
VII. MuNiciPAL RESPONSES To RETURNEES HIGHLIGHT TENSIONS BETWEEN
CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTs
A. Different Sets of Assumptions About the Composition of Japanese
Society Govern National and Local Policies
The differing responses by local and central governments to issues
regarding legal foreign residents highlight the political tension between the
institutions of local and national governance. By accommodating
foreigners' ethnic difference through policies and programs that facilitate
their social and administrative incorporation into Japanese society, local
accommodation policies are at odds with the official national immigration
policy, which is based on the premise that the entry of foreigners must be
limited so as not to threaten national security.
216
Japan's racial dynamics are grounded in an ossified belief in the
"myth of homogeneity"-a carefully designed and perpetuated conception
of a unique Japanese race.2 17 It is the notion that the Japanese people
(minzoku) possess what are assumed to be unique historical, geographical,
and cultural characteristics of the Japanese nation. 218 Notwithstanding the
refutation of Japanese uniqueness by scientists and scholars, the perception
216 Pak, supra note 101, at 252.
217 Levin, supra note 165, at 498-99. One scholar describes the development of the illusion of
homogeneity as follows:
While the physical and historical evidence of migrations to the Japanese islands could not be
ignored, these were deemed to be of such antiquity that they had long since formed a single
"race" and culture. Cultural indebtedness to China was also acknowledged, but this too was
relegated to the distant past. As represented in school textbooks after 1910, it had become
axiomatic that responsibility for the generation of Asia had fallen to the Japanese by virtue of
their innately superior qualities.
Michael Weiner, The Invention of Identity: "Self' and "Other" in Pre-War Japan, in JAPAN'S
MINORITIEs: THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENErIY, supra note 1, at 1, 8.
215 Weiner, supra note 217, at 5. This sense of nation was believed to exist from a common ancestry
rather than shared culture. Id. The nation was projected as an extended family, the kazoku kokka (family
state), a notion which was used as a political tool by the Meiji government to unite the people with a sense
of homogeneity and community. Id. at 1-2, 5. See also John Lie, The Discourse of Japaneseness, in JAPAN
AND GLOBAL MIGRATION, supra note 14, at 70, 84-87.
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219among Japanese that Japan is a monoracial society is deeply ingrained.
As one scholar remarks, "[t]his social system involves the denial or virtual
denial as de minimus of the presence of ethnic and racial minorities in
Japanese society. 220 Indeed, the Japanese government has historically dealt
with ethnic minorities in its country by subordinating them through policies
of assimilation and exclusion. 22' Traces of this practice continue to exist
today in the form of restrictive immigration and strict naturalization laws
premised on the assumption of an ethnically homogeneous nation (with a
small space carved out for permanent residents).
The policy-making entities of the central government reflect
contradictory views with respect to the composition of Japanese society.
Despite the demographic crisis and the economy's need for outside workers,
various branches of the Japanese government have expressed reservations
about admitting foreigners. The Ministry of Labour has opposed the
importation of foreign workers because of its concern about the political and
social ramifications of a more heterogeneous workforce and the inevitable
demands for admitting spouses and children were foreign workers permitted
to stay in Japan for any extended period.222 Instead, the Ministry called for
increasing automation, extending the mandatory retirement age, encouraging
more women to enter the labor force, using labor more efficiently in the
service sector, as well as exporting some production facilities to other Asian
countries. 223 Similarly, the Economic Council of Japan, in its report entitled
On Globalization and the World Economy in 2010, also opposed the
importation of immigrant workers, warning of increased costs for social
welfare and services needed for "social adjustment, to allow people with
219 One commentator notes that national identity or character is illustrated in inherently shared
feelings among the Japanese people. Hiromi Sasamoto, One Man's Quest for Japanese Identity, DAILY
YOMIURL Jan. 26, 1999, LEXIS, Japan Country Files. For example, when astronaut Chiaki Mukai went
into space, she composed the first half of a waka poem (a traditional five-line, 31-syllable poem) and asked
the public to complete the second half. Id. Her request was met with an enthusiastic 140,000 responses.
Id. Many Japanese consider it perfectly natural to write a traditional poem, even in such unusual situations.
Id.; see generally, JOHN LIE, MULTmTHNIC JAPAN (2001).
220 See Levin, supra note 165, at 498. In fact, in its 1980 report to the UN Human Rights
Commission, the Japanese government denied the existence of ethnic minorities in Japan, stating: "Every
citizen has the right to enjoy his culture, practice his religion, and use his language guaranteed under the
Japanese Constitution. However, ethnic minority groups do not exist in Japan." Stevens, supra note 162,
at 187 (emphasis added.).
221 This was certainly true in regard to the Ainu during the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, and
is still true today in regard to the Ainu, as well as Japan's other ethnic minority groups: Korean and
Talwanese permanent residents, Nikkeijin long-term residents, Burakumin, Okinawans, and migrant
workers from Asia-Pacific countries. See Lie, supra note 218, at 81-84. The fact remains, however, that
Japan is multiethnic.
222 Weiner, supra note 12, at 12.
2 Id.
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different religions and customs to live together., 224 The Ministry of Justice
justifies its opposition to admitting foreign workers by pointing to higher
crime rates committed by immigrants than Japanese. 25 Consonant with
these views, the linchpin of Japan's immigration policy continues to be that
of admitting migrants on a temporary basis and assuring their return to their
home countries after two or three years.
226
One recent government report seems to recognize the need for a
change in policy. In January 2000, the Prime Minister's Commission on
Japan's Goals in the 2 1st Century released a report on governance in the new
millenium, and advocated the creation of "a more explicit immigration and
permanent residence system so as to encourage foreigners who can be
expected to contribute to the development of the Japanese society to move in
and possibly take up permanent residence here."2 7 Along these lines, the
Ministry of Justice will review long-term visa qualification requirements,
simplify procedures, and expand the scope of the trainee program. 228 These
changes however, are not for labor migrants, but for foreign professionals
and skilled workers.229 Thus, while the report discusses broadening the
current immigration structure, it again reflects the central government's
carefully designed construction of who is to be included in the composition
of Japanese society; that is, immigration by foreigners will be tolerated, but
only the desirable immigrants who are skilled, educated professionals who
tend to live interspersed throughout the community and who, therefore, are
less conspicuous.
In sum, these reports demonstrate the central government's conflicting
views about foreign migrants, and it has yet to develop a unified, national
policy on this issue. Official rhetoric has failed to materialize in the form of
concrete policies that embody a realistic vision about the role of immigration
in Japan's future.
224 See Japan Economic Council, supra note 15, Section 2.2.2.
M2 Weiner, supra note 12, at 12; Basic Plan, supra note 4, pt. I.
226 Terasawa, supra note 44, at 219.
227 See Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century Delivers Report, at
http://www.embassyjapancanada.org/AboutJapan/Politics/pmcomml.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2001). The
report was called, The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment and Better Governance in the New
Millenium. Id.
228 PAPADEMETRIOU & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 50.
229 Id. at 46-52; see also SOPEMI, supra note 40, at 166.
230 In contrast, migrant laborers tend to congregate by forming ethnic communities, which makes
their presence in Japanese society not only obvious but also more problematic in terms of coexisting with
other Japanese residents. World Migration Report: 2000, supra note 52, at 64.
VOL. I11 No. 3
LEGAL MULTICULTURALISM IN JAPAN?
B. Local Governments are in a Unique Position to Instigate Legal
Change
In contradiction to the underlying premise of national immigration
policy, some local governments are fashioning policies of multiculturalism.
Because local governments are closer to the day-to-day lives of immigrants
than is the central government, the massive influx of foreigners has forced
affected municipal governments to develop policies and programs to
facilitate the administrative and social integration of foreigners into Japanese
society, while at the same time accommodating for their ethnic difference.
Local governments are developing programs that reach out to
foreigners, even though the national government has deemed this
unnecessary, for several reasons. First, local governments encounter
immigration in a different way than does national government.21 1 Many city
government departments have mandated duties that involve providing
services to the non-citizens within their jurisdictions. For example, because
local governments must enforce the Alien Registration Law, local officials
come into direct contact with foreigners, who are required to register
themselves in the cities in which they reside.2 32  Second, the progressive
local citizens' movements during the 1960s and 1970s made independent
policy-making at the local level the norm.2 3 3  Third, "internationalization"
has been redefined by local governments to include outreach to foreign
residents.234
Local governments are proactively intervening to prevent the kinds of
problems European cities have encountered as a result of immigration. They
are concerned that the migrants' problems, if left unresolved, could lead to
231 Pak, supra note 101, at 248.
232 Id. at 248.
233 See generally PURNENDRA JAIN, LOCAL POLITICS AND POICYMAKING IN JAPAN (1989); KURT
STENER ED. ET AL., POLrFICAL OPPOSMrION AND LOCAL PoLmcS IN JAPAN (1980); STEVEN R. REED,
JAPANESE PREFECURES AND POLCYMAKING (1986); RICHARD J. SAMUELS, THE POLmCS OF REGIONAL
POLICY IN JAPAN: LOCALTIES INCORPORATED? (1983).
2m Pak, supra note 101, at 262. The term "internationalization" (kokusaika) was frequently used in
government reports during the 1970s and 1980s and is a controversial concept within Japanese politics.
Weiner, supra note 12, at 10. In general, it refers to greater interaction with the rest of the world through
the use of better telecommunication and transportation, and full participation in the global economy and
international institutions. Internationalization did not refer to "the incorporation of foreigners into
Japanese society and becoming ethnically diverse." Id. Local governments, however, began to redefine
this term into "an active process of increasing the openness of Japanese politics, assuming greater
responsibilities towards the global community and ending discrimination at home." Pak, supra note 101, at
249. Many local governments began to pursue cultural exchange programs with their counterparts in other
countries (e.g., Sister City Exchange Programs) to develop local accommodation policies and programs to
solve the problems associated with newcomers in their communities. Id. at 262.
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outright conflict between foreigners and Japanese. 235 The most progressive
local governments further contradict national immigration rhetoric by
defining foreign residents "as local citizens who deserve the right to be in
communication with their local government by virtue of their contributions
to the community, payment of taxes and, more generally, because of their
involvement in everyday life. ' '236  The elimination of nationality
requirements for municipal public service positions by many local
governments is another source of tension between central and local
governments.
237
C. Characteristics of Legal Multiculturalism
The local accommodation policies and programs are significant
because their existence, although not formally or legally recognized by any
national law or policy, acts as a defacto policy of multiculturalism.
Multiculturalism recognizes that individuals are neither
abstractions nor are they sui generis; they spring from specific
and diverse cultures which may be valued by and be of value to
them in any number of ways, and which they may therefore
cherish and wish to preserve. Multiculturalism asserts that
individual well-being is importantly related to cultural integrity,
and thus argues that the state has a role in guarding that
integrity.
231
The United States, Australia, and Canada provide the best examples of
nations that have developed multicultural institutions and policies.239 In the
United States, multiculturalism was an intellectual movement of the civil
235 Pak, supra note 101, at 249.
236 See id. at 252. Local governments justify such treatment of aliens under the Local Government
Act, under which local authorities have a duty to ensure the safety, health, and welfare of all local citizens,
including non-Japanese. Id.; Sellek, supra note 1, at 195.
237 PAPADEMETRIOU & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 33. For example, when Kawasaki voted in 1996
to eliminate nationality as a requirement for city employees, it also passed a second ordinance reserving
higher-level positions for Japanese nationals in a concession to the central government. Id.
231 See John Kane, From Ethnic Exclusion to Ethnic Diversity: The Australian Path to
Multiculturalism, in ETHNIcrrY AND GROUP RIGHTS 540, 555-56 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds.,
1997).
239 STEPHEN CASTLES & ALASTAIR DAVIDSON, CrIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION 159-71 (2000). In
addition, European countries such as Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Britain have begun to implement
general multicultural policies, and even countries opposed to the concept in principle, such as Germany and
France, have some multicultural dimensions in their social and educational policies. Id. at 159.
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rights era of the 1960s and 1970s.240 Since then, the United States "has been
reconceptualized as a multicultural society, to which people of differing
backgrounds can belong as citizens without abandoning their cultural
distinctiveness.
241
Whereas multiculturalism in the United States is grounded in
providing redress for historical wrongs against different groups of minorities
in the form of affirmative action programs and anti-discrimination statutes,
multiculturalism in Australia, Canada, and Europe is primarily understood as
a public policy framework for managing immigration and ethnic
difference.
While Japanese local government accommodation policies are not
quite as sophisticated in substance as those found in other multicultural
states, they demonstrate a commitment to multiculturalism. Still, as the
experiences of foreigners' integration into Japanese society show, simply
having a local accommodation policy in place does not necessarily inoculate
against racism. Even Nikkeijin, who are specially admitted into Japan under
the government's ethnocentric belief that they share the same "Japanese
blood," have been isolated by mainstream Japanese society because of their
ethnic difference. Thus, beyond policy rhetoric lies a more fundamental
issue for Japan-whether Japanese society and government are prepared to
discard the "myth of homogeneity" and truly embrace the goals of
multiculturalism.
VIII. CONCLUSION: A NEW LEGAL POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR JAPAN?
Increased international migration to Japan over the past decade has
had contradictory effects on central and local governments. Despite some
government policies (such as the trainee program) that provide foreign
workers with a back door into Japan, the central government's main
response to international labor migration has and continues to be restrictive.
This official rhetoric is grounded in the historical perpetuation of the "myth
of (ethnic) homogeneity"-a national self-image characterized by ethnic
homogeneity (cultural, social, linguistic sameness). In contrast to the central
government's reluctance to address issues concerning foreign residents in
2m id. at 160.
1 See id.
242 Id. at 164. For example, the Australian government's official policy of multiculturalism, the
National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, included policies charged with providing "equitable
treatment for ethnic individuals," policies that "generously funded ethnic organizations to enable them to
provide services to their members," and policies addressing "specific problems arising in the state's
dealings with various ethnic groups." Kane, supra note 238, at 551.
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Japan, local governments most affected by the presence of foreign residents
are filling the policy void left by the central government.
Because the real, day-to-day obstacles foreign residents face-such as
cultural conflicts with Japanese residents and access to social welfare
benefits-take place in the cities in which they live and work, local
governments have implemented policy measures that facilitate the transition
from once entirely Japanese communities into now multicultural
communities. In some cities, municipal governments have totally digressed
from national policy by treating foreigners as local citizens. Moreover, local
accommodation policies are being implemented independent of any political
demands by minority activist groups, indicating the proactive approach
being taken by local policymakers. As such, local governments play an
important role in challenging the dominant perception of national identity, in
recognizing the rights of foreign residents to assert their ethnic difference,
and in instigating the central government to reconsider the future of national
immigration policy. In this way, local accommodation policies and
programs represent a fundamental premise of liberalism: that every
individual must be treated with equal respect. As the population of foreign
residents increases and as they are afforded greater rights as local citizens,
they and their Japan-born descendants will eventually seek greater rights-in
citizenship, employment, politics, etc. Consequently, the central
government should take a proactive approach in formulating national
policies addressing immigration and immigration-related issues.
Although Nikkeijin are small in number, their presence is significant
for several reasons. First, in the course of designing administrative and
social accommodation policies and programs for Nikkeijin, local
governments have included other foreign residents. Second, the ironic
displacement of Nikkeijin as an ethnic minority within Japan raises the
question of who Japan defines as "Japanese." Finally, as the experiences of
some cities show, local governments serve as a forum where Japanese
policymakers can instigate progressive legal change for the understanding of
community membership. Thus, in the absence of any national policy to
address immigration-related issues, efforts at the local levels to promote
coexistence with foreigners by accommodating their ethnic difference serves
as a de facto policy of legal multiculturalism in Japan.
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